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MAKING AND UNMAKING CITIZENS: 
LAW AND THE SHAPING OF CIVIC CAPACITY 
Tabatha Abu El-Haj* 
American democracy is more fragile today than in recent memory. As evidence 
of stubborn imbalances in political influence grow, so too does public skepticism 
concerning the relative benefits of our democratic institutions. Scholars have taken 
note, and two dominant camps have emerged to offer proposals for restoring 
democratic accountability and responsiveness. The first, like the public, identifies 
the flood of money into electoral politics as the primary source of our troubles, 
whereas the second points to political parties as the root of the crisis. More recently, 
however, a nascent third approach has emerged. Looking beyond the usual 
suspects—money in politics or the state of our political parties—its focus is on 
legal reforms that would permit everyday Americans to exercise political power 
through organizations capable of providing a counterweight to the political 
influence of wealth. 
This Article seeks to further develop the efforts of this third approach. It argues 
that a more nuanced understanding of the recursive relationship between 
governance and civil society—one that appreciates the ways that public policy, as 
instantiated in legislation, inevitably influences the trajectory of civil society—
permits us to envision a broader conception of law’s role in democratic reform. 
This broader conception is particularly critical given that several traditional 
routes have been effectively foreclosed by the Supreme Court. Toward that end, this 
Article identifies opportunities for law and politics—nudged perhaps by good 
governance philanthropists and technological advances—to make considerable 
strides toward rebuilding a participatory civil society capable of demanding the 
recognition of elected officials. 
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INTRODUCTION
American democracy is more fragile today than in recent 
memory.1 The corrosion of essential democratic norms—from civil-
ity to judicial independence to freedom of the press—appears to 
be accelerating. Public faith in democracy is eroding, with a rising 
number of Americans reporting that they no longer feel confident 
in the relative benefits of democratic institutions.2 Nonvoters fre-
quently cite a lack of faith in the efficacy of voting to explain their 
decision to forego their democratic rights.3 Meanwhile, across the 
partisan divide, Americans express anxiety about the corrosive in-
fluence of money on politics.4
Too often, politicians seek to capitalize on this growing cyni-
cism, rather than striving to restore faith in democratic institutions 
and the rule of law. Indeed, some have become increasingly brazen 
in their efforts to thwart democratic accountability. In Wisconsin, 
during the most recent round of redistricting, legislators flagrantly 
solicited experts for partisan electoral maps and then asked those 
experts to go back and assure them that the effect would last the 
entire decade.5 The attorney representing North Carolina recently 
went so far as to defend such practices as a legislative prerogative 
preserved by federalism.6 The North Carolina legislature stripped 
its governor of key executive powers when voters elected a gover-
                                                   
 1. See No Jargon: Democracy in Decline, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://nojargon.libsyn.com/episode-119-democracy-in-decline. 
 2. See Roberto Foa & Yascha Mounk, Are Americans Losing Faith in Democracy?, VOX
(Dec. 18, 2015, 10:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2015/12/18/9360663/is-
democracy-in-trouble.  
 3. See Asma Khalid, On the Sidelines of Democracy: Exploring Why So Many Americans Don’t 
Vote, MORNING EDITION (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/645223716/on-
the-sidelines-of-democracy-exploring-why-so-many-americans-dont-vote; Don Gonyea, What 
Some West Virginia Residents Have to Say on Why They Don’t Vote, MORNING EDITION (Sept. 10, 
2018, 5:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/646422511/what-some-west-virginia-
residents-have-to-saynt-on-why-they-dont-vote.
 4. Bradley Jones, Most Americans Want to Limit Campaign Spending, Say Big Donors Have 
Greater Political Influence, PEW RES. CTR. (May 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/05/08/most-americans-want-to-limit-campaign-spending-say-big-donors-have-
greater-political-influence/.  
 5. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 849, 896 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 
1916 (2018) (noting that Republican legislators specifically requested mapmakers produce 
“Assertive” and “Aggressive” maps favoring the party). Democrats acted similarly egregiously 
in Maryland. See also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2510–11 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“Events in Maryland make for a similarly grisly tale.”). 
 6. Compare Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–18, Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 
2484 (2019) (No.18-422) (defending prerogative of state legislatures to set explicit partisan 
targets for redistricting processes) with Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (holding that parti-
san gerrymandering claims are not justiciable even though “[e]xcessive partisanship in dis-
tricting leads to results that reasonably seem unjust” and are “incompatible with democratic 
principles”) (internal citation omitted). See also id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (reflecting 
that “partisan gerrymanders . . . debase[] and dishonor[] our democracy, turning upside-
down the core American idea that all governmental power derives from the people”). 
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nor of a different party, and legislatures in Wisconsin and Michi-
gan followed suit after partisan losses in statewide races in 2018.7
While these examples are particularly egregious, the fact is that 
elected officials routinely seek to insulate themselves from ac-
countability at the polls.8
When combined with partisan polarization, the demise of elec-
toral competition and the salience of the party primary, these ma-
neuvers render American elected officials only weakly accountable 
to their constituents. 
Indeed, some political scientists argue that elected officials today 
are significantly more responsive to the interests of wealthy Ameri-
cans, while responsiveness to the concerns and preferences of the 
general electorate is largely coincidental.9 Quantifying the inequal-
ities in congressional responsiveness, Martin Gilens and Benjamin 
I. Page report that when support for a given proposal among afflu-
ent Americans reaches 75%, one can expect the policy will be 
adopted 46% of the time, whereas when 75% of middle-class Amer-
icans support a policy, it “is adopted only 24 percent of the time.”10
To be sure, no one expects legislative policymaking in the Amer-
ican system to simply follow the public’s orders (especially as 
measured by public opinion polls). Still, the persistent disregard of 
the public’s priorities—from delivering sensible gun control to 
providing permanent legal status to childhood immigrant arrivals 
                                                   
 7. The legislation in Michigan was vetoed by the outgoing Republican Governor. See
Miriam Seifter, Judging Power Plays in the American States, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1217, 1224–27, 
1231–36 (2019) (offering a detailed description of recent efforts to “thwart . . . expressions 
of popular will,” while describing how most have been struck down by state courts). 
 8. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, Why It Can Happen Here, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/opinion/trump-republican-party-
authoritarianism.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fopinion-columnists. 
 9. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest 
Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 573 (2014) (rigorously analyzing a data 
set that measured trajectory of 1779 policy issues between 1981 and 2002 and concluding 
that the United States has become a “democracy by coincidence”). It is worth emphasizing 
that none of the main critics of Professors Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page’s study substan-
tially undermine their main findings or their conclusion that the United States is a “democ-
racy by coincidence.” See, e.g., Omar S. Bashir, Testing Inferences About American Politics: A Re-
view of the “Oligarchy” Result, 2 RES. & POL. 1, 1–2 (2015) (criticizing Gilens and Page’s 
quantitative method); Peter K. Enns, Relative Policy Support and Coincidental Representation, 13 
PERSP. ON POL. 1053, 1058–61 (2015) (conceding that “[c]oincidental representation ap-
pears to be the norm” but rejecting the conclusion that this comes “at the expense of those 
in the middle”). For their responses to these criticisms, see Martin Gilens, The Insufficiency of 
“Democracy by Coincidence”: A Response to Peter K. Enns, 13 PERSP. ON POL. 1065 (2015) and 
Martin Gilens, Simulating Representation: The Devil’s in the Detail, 3 RES. & POL. 1 (2016). 
 10. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Critics Argued with Our Analysis of U.S. Political 
Inequality. Here Are 5 Ways They’re Wrong, WASH. POST (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/23/critics-challenge-
our-portrait-of-americas-political-inequality-heres-5-ways-they-are-wrong/ (noting further 
that opposition to a policy by 25% of affluent Americans results in a 4% chance of adoption, 
whereas a policy similarly opposed by the middle class has a 40% chance of adoption).  
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to raising the minimum wage—is unquestionably concerning.11
Our republican Constitution was designed to create a space for 
elected officials to shape policymaking at a distance from the im-
mediate preferences of constituents. The intent, however, was to 
prevent kneejerk majoritarianism, not to preclude responsiveness 
and accountability to the citizenry. 
In legal circles, two camps dominate the academic discussion 
about how to restore accountability and responsiveness to our 
democratic institutions.12 The first, like the public, identifies the 
flood of money into electoral politics as the primary source of our 
troubles. These scholars criticize the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Citizens United v. FEC, blaming it for the rise of Super PACs and 
similar independent expenditure groups and for the recent explo-
sion of money in elections.13 They offer a variety of proposals 
aimed at reducing the influence of money in politics. 
The second school points to political parties as the root of the 
crisis.14 Legislative dysfunction is attributed to polarization and the 
weakened position of party leaders relative to other partisan ac-
                                                   
 11. A large body of empirical research demonstrates that elected officials in both par-
ties are largely unresponsive (sometimes stubbornly so) to the concerns of Main Street. See, 
e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL 
POWER IN AMERICA 113–17, 102–03 figs. 4.2 & 4.3 (2012) [hereinafter GILENS, AFFLUENCE 
AND INFLUENCE] (demonstrating that legislators are most responsive to high-income Ameri-
cans and least responsive to the poor and, further, that this differential responsiveness holds 
across all policy domains although it is starkest for economic policy); LARRY M. BARTELS,
UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 173–75, 287–89 
(2008) (concluding that as it currently functions, the American political system allows poli-
cymakers “considerable latitude” to pursue their own goals, even with respect to “issues on 
which public opinion seems to be especially firm and stable” and attributing this agency 
problem to the ideological and partisan commitments of elected officials). For current ex-
amples see Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, Voters Are Running Out of Patience, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2018/02/21/voters-are-
running-out-of-patience/?utm_term=.c99910280042 and Noah Smith, Opinion, Raise the 
Minimum Wage, Congress, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2018, 11:15 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-13/new-congress-should-raise-the-
minimum-wage. 
 12. A final group of election law reformers focused on barriers to the vote, including 
redistricting. In general, however, these scholars ground their work in a rights framework 
rather than concerns about responsiveness or stubborn imbalances in power. 
 13. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2016); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, 
Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425 (2015); ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS 
DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014).
 14. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeovers of Our Hallowed 
Out Political Parties, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 845 (2017); RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & JONATHAN RAUCH,
CTR. EFFECTIVE PUBLIC MGMT., BROOKINGS INST., THE STATE OF STATE PARTIES—AND HOW
STRENGTHENING THEM CAN IMPROVE OUR POLITICS (2016); Michael S. Kang, The Brave New 
World of Party Campaign Finance Law, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2016); IAN VANDEWALKER &
DANIEL I. WEINER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, STRONGER PARTIES, STRONGER DEMOCRACY:
RETHINKING REFORM 3 (2015); Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmenta-
tion, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804 (2014). 
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tors.15 Policy prescriptions frequently focus on further deregulation 
of campaign finance laws—hypothesizing that good governance 
will be restored when political power is returned to party leaders 
and the influence of Super PACs and other ideological donors is 
diminished.16
More recently, however, a nascent third approach to democratic 
reform has emerged in the legal literature. Looking beyond the 
usual suspects—money in politics, the state of our political parties, 
polarization, and the near extinction of competitive elections—it 
has focused on the ways that rising economic inequality has fed the 
stubborn imbalance in political influence.17 This third approach 
shares the progressive impulses of the first school. Objecting to its 
myopic focus on electoral spending, however, it seeks to extend 
the second school’s focus on organizations as a potential locus for 
democratic revival beyond political parties to civic associations as 
well.18
The central claim of this third school is that reversing the trend 
toward extreme political and economic inequality requires strate-
gies focused on bolstering the organizational capacity of non-elite 
Americans to enable them to more effectively provide a counter-
weight to the political influence of wealth.19 Thus, Kate Andrias has 
argued that scholars should pay more attention to “facilitating the 
countervailing power of ordinary citizens and their organizations 
                                                   
 15. For an overview of this analysis and critique of its policy prescriptions, see Tabatha 
Abu El-Haj, Networking the Party: First Amendment Rights & the Pursuit of Responsive Party Gov-
ernment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1225 (2018) [hereinafter Abu El-Haj, Networking the Party] (of-
fering an alternative account of the weakness of our party system and the deficit in respon-
siveness). 
 16. The current dysfunction is attributed to structural changes and regulatory incen-
tives that empower individual candidates and independent expenditure groups (including 
through the flow of money) and disempower parties and their leaders, who are viewed as 
having greater interest in governing through compromise and moderation. See, e.g., Issa-
charoff, supra note 14, at 864–70; Pildes, supra note 14, at 828–33.  
 17. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and 
Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419 (2015) [hereinafter Andrias, Separations of Wealth]; Jo-
seph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669 
(2014); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 1445 (2016). 
 18. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 
1129–30, 1132–33 (2016) [hereinafter Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform].
 19. See, e.g., K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 3, 142–44 (2017) 
(arguing that to the degree “our current economic pathologies are rooted in disparities of 
economic and political power,” the solution is to “build[] a more equitable, inclusive, and 
responsive democratic system”—one which activates civic associations by providing visible 
targets and levers for collective political action); see also K. Sabeel Rahman, Policymaking as 
Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 315, 354 (2018) [hereinafter Rahman, Policymaking 
as Power-Building] (“Altering the existing balance of power thus requires finding ways to bol-
ster the underlying capacity of affected but relatively under-powered interests to exercise 
power and influence on decision-makers.”). 
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in governance.”20 And previously, I made the case for why “those 
concerned about the outsized political influence of moneyed 
elites” should turn their attention to strategies for “undercut[ting] 
the influence money buys” by “enhanc[ing] the civic and political 
organizations of ordinary Americans,” rather than “wasting their 
limited resources chasing after campaign finance reforms aimed at 
taking money out of politics and doctrinal theories aimed at justify-
ing those reforms.”21
The recognition that “organization, like wealth, is itself a source 
of political power” underlies this third approach.22 Unions offer a 
prime illustration of this point: during their heyday in the middle 
of the twentieth century, a period marked by prosperity and rela-
tive economic equality, unions routinely leveraged their ability to 
mobilize workers to gain access to elected officials of both parties, 
offsetting “the financial power of the business lobby.”23
As such, this scholarship has focused on offering a range of dis-
crete “interventions aimed at addressing inequalities in organiza-
tional capacity.”24 These have included reforms to reduce legal bar-
riers to collective action in the workplace25 and suggestions for how 
to design government institutions to facilitate broader civic en-
gagement.26 Taking the latter approach, K. Sabeel Rahman has 
prioritized identifying ways to enhance the opportunities for eve-
ryday citizens to influence “the bureaucratic processes of govern-
ance and policy implementation.”27
                                                   
 20. Kate Andrias, Confronting Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 2 (2016); see 
also Andrias, Separations of Wealth, supra note 17, at 440–44. 
 21. Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 18, at 1132–33 (arguing that 
the potential of campaign finance regulation to root out the political influence of the 
wealthy is significantly limited by the First Amendment’s requirement that there be ample 
routes for political influence). 
 22. Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 
YALE L.J. 148, 167 (2013) (noting further that organization “enables groups to build political 
power that, like the power derived from wealth, is portable across processes of participa-
tion”). 
 23. JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 157, 160–61, 181 (2014) (recount-
ing that “[g]iven labor’s strength, politicians from heavily industrialized locales with a strong 
union presence simply had no choice but to court labor’s vote, regardless of their own party 
allegiances”); see also JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW 
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 140 
(2010) (detailing ways unions were able to effectively counter the efforts of business on a 
variety of fronts, including the minimum wage). 
 24. Sachs, supra note 22, at 166. 
 25. See, e.g., id. at 198–203 (proposing various legal reforms that would enhance work-
ers’ ability to organize); see also Dayne Lee, Note, Bundling Alt-Labor: How Policy Reform Can 
Facilitate Political Organization in Emerging Worker Movements, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 509 
(2016).
 26. K. Sabeel Rahman, From Civic Tech to Civic Capacity: The Case of Citizen Audits, 50 PS:
POL. SCI. & POL. 751 (2017). 
 27. RAHMAN, supra note 19, at 15, 22–23, 160–63 (arguing that insofar as agencies have 
become the “‘front-line’ institutions of governance” administrative processes must be re-
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Underappreciated to date, however, is that this third approach 
offers a critical intervention in the debates about how to reform 
our democracy. By drawing attention to the political role of civic 
organizations, it brings into relief that there are, in fact, three 
phases to democracy (civil society, governance, and elections)28
and, further, that our democratic dysfunctions can stem from any 
of these three phases of democracy: civil society (political inputs), 
governance (policy outputs) or the electoral interface designed to 
underwrite that relationship. And it implies that there are three 
potential points of entry for democratic reform. 
Without denying any of the other causes for the current state of 
democratic politics,29 the third school thus lays the foundation for 
reimagining the entire project of democracy reform. To date, 
democratic reformers have largely focused on the electoral inter-
face—identifying and redressing impairments such as redistricting, 
the state of political parties, ballot access, and campaign finance.30
Little attention has been paid to potential impairments in political 
inputs themselves. This is a mistake. Elections and political parties 
represent only one point of entry into American democracy; civil 
society forms another. 
As far back as the nineteenth century, social theorists have un-
derstood that civil society—particularly civic associations—play a 
critical role in underwriting the participation necessary for demo-
cratic responsiveness.31 The inverse, unfortunately, is equally true: 
                                                   
vamped in ways that “affirmatively enhance the countervailing power of ordinary citizens”); 
see also Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, supra note 19, at 376 (describing institutional 
designs with the potential to unleash “the (under-utilized) potential [of regulatory agencies] 
to house and foster a more inclusive, empowered form of participation and engagement” 
and to “mitigat[e] disparities of political power”). 
 28. Cf. K. Sabeel Rahman, (Re)Constructing Democracy in Crisis, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1552, 
1558–61 (2018) (arguing that a recognition “that democracies require state institutions, civil 
society organizations, and interfaces to work well” allows us to focus on “(1) the problem of 
systemic inequalities in political power and influence, and (2) the problem of systemic polit-
ical exclusion, particularly along lines of race and ethnicity”). 
 29. I have considered how these other causes might be addressed in other work. See
Abu El-Haj, Networking the Party, supra note 15, at 1250–75; Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Fi-
nance Reform, supra note 18, at 1162–63, 1175–83. 
 30. To a lesser degree, scholarship has attended to deficiencies in governance itself.
 31. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillip Bradley ed., 
Vintage Classics 1990) (1835). For similar claims about civil society in the modern era see
ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD 
EFFECT (2012) (reporting finding of study with Doug McAdam that shows civic participation 
is strongest in neighborhoods with the highest concentration of nonprofit organizations, 
other than Black churches); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC 
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 91–99 (1994) [hereinafter PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY 
WORK] (reviewing evidence that better governance in more economically advanced regions 
of the country is attributable to the quality of local civil society, as measured by density in 
civic associations, levels of newspaper readership, and turnout for national referendum, 
among other things); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 344–47 (2000) [hereinafter PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE] (reviewing 
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the absence or weakening of civil society can prejudice the demo-
cratic process.32 Indeed, while the public has been preoccupied 
with Citizens United v. FEC and the flood of money it unleashed into 
electoral politics, political scientists have been attributing the in-
creasing solicitude of government officials to affluent citizens to 
their organizational advantage relative to the middle class, while 
dating the phenomenon to well before Citizens United.33
This Article seeks to develop the broader implications of the 
third school—and to do so at a moment when many of the tradi-
tional approaches to reform appear increasingly foreclosed. To-
ward that end, it begins with a comprehensive diagnosis of the 
weaknesses in civil society that currently undermine its ability to 
foster a virtuous democratic circle from political participation to 
policy responsiveness. It explains how changes in the form of civic 
associations since the 1970s have compounded the long-standing 
unrepresentativeness of political inputs. The Achilles’ heel of 
American civil society is the form of civic representation. Civic as-
sociations representing Main Street interests today have largely 
stepped back from fostering active forms of civic and political par-
ticipation, thereby becoming less capable of advancing democratic 
accountability and responsiveness. 
Second, and more importantly, this Article offers reasons to be-
lieve that something can be done about these weaknesses, includ-
ing through law. Legislation, it turns out, does far more than dis-
tribute or deny benefits and rights to individuals. It shapes civil 
society by influencing individuals’ relationship to and participation 
in democracy, as well as the incentives that exist for building politi-
cal organizations. Policies that distribute visible and generous (ide-
ally universal) benefits in fair, non-arbitrary ways recognize indi-
viduals’ citizenship and communicate the value of government. 
They create reasons to organize on the part of beneficiaries and 
incentives for political parties and elites to mobilize those same 
beneficiaries. Other forms of policymaking do the exact opposite. 
This, then, is the central contribution of this Article. Civil society 
is neither independent of nor impervious to law.34 Civil society, in-
                                                   
evidence that communities with strong civic associations both demand and get better gov-
ernment); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 65 (1995) (“The norms and networks of civic engagement also powerfully affect 
the performance of representative government.”). 
 32. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 31, at 114–15. 
 33. Task Force on Inequality & Am. Democracy, Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, American De-
mocracy in an Age of Rising Inequality, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 651, 657 (2004). 
 34. JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA 7, 189–92 (2d
ed. 2017) (contrasting social theories that account for how “civil society is not an autono-
mous sphere of self-contained democratic activity” with Tocqueville’s anti-statist conception 
of civil society, which views civil society as a space untouched by law, and remarking that the 
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cluding its potential as a source of democratic accountability or 
dysfunction, is instead deeply entwined with law. Indeed, changes 
in the form of federal policymaking since the Reagan era have at 
once contributed to income inequality and to the inequalities in 
political mobilization and organization that impede the ability of 
low- and middle-income Americans to resist the political sway of 
elites and super-elites today.35 In this regard, the legal-institutional 
influence on civil society extends much further than the First 
Amendment and the political culture of tolerance that is necessary 
to protect the freedom of speech, association, and the press.36
Once we recognize that public policy as instantiated in legisla-
tion will play some role in the trajectory of civil society and, hence, 
democracy, it is possible to move beyond the myopic focus on pro-
cedural reforms and to envision policies capable of motivating in-
dividuals to participate in our democracy and stimulating the reor-
ganization of the interests of everyday Americans. It is possible, in 
other words, to begin to see a role for law in reversing the current 
weaknesses in civil society. 
Ultimately, it is that project to which this Article turns. In doing 
so, it offers a model of what it would mean for lawyers (all lawyers, 
not just election lawyers) to begin to attend to the law’s secondary 
effects on civil society. Like the erosion of democratic institutions 
and norms, the restoration will necessarily be an incremental and 
complex process. The pertinent task is, therefore, to identify the 
opportunities that exist, without ignoring the corresponding con-
straints that will inevitably shape and limit those efforts. 
Make no mistake. There are no silver bullet policy prescriptions 
in what follows. Instead, this Article shows how law’s role in demo-
cratic reform can be expanded even as the burden of restoring 
American democracy must be shared. In this regard, it identifies 
existing legislative opportunities to make considerable strides to-
ward rebuilding a participatory civil society, but also the ways that 
project could be advanced by both technology and the funding de-
cisions of good governance philanthropists. 
The critical stance toward reform embodied in this Article is that 
restoration of a robust civil society capable of organizing and mobi-
lizing ordinary Americans in ways that facilitate their ability to de-
mand responsiveness and enforce accountability is by no means 
guaranteed. But it is also not foreclosed. Unlike in 2016 when I be-
                                                   
latter continues to have a hold over contemporary American social theory); see also CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002). 
 35. See infra notes 229–243 and accompanying text. 
 36. Accord Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, supra note 19, at 318–20 (arguing 
that it is time to recognize the “power-shifting dimensions of policy design” and the institu-
tional features of their implementation). 
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gan this Article, it is no longer possible to only emphasize the 
abundant weakness of American democracy. The fact is that the 
election in 2016 gave birth to some more positive democratic nar-
ratives. The 2018 midterm elections witnessed the highest level of 
voter turnout in nearly a century. It also brought record numbers 
of women to office and presented a significant step forward in di-
versifying the membership of Congress. Most importantly, those 
outcomes, as we will see, were a product of a civic revival. 
Part I identifies three critical weaknesses of contemporary civil 
society and the ways these weaknesses contribute to the stubborn 
imbalances in political influence in American politics. Part II ex-
plains the ways in which legislative and regulatory efforts have sec-
ond-order effects on the political capacity of citizens in a democra-
cy, and thus why legislation has a role to play in either reversing or 
reinforcing the current trend. Finally, Part III offers a template of 
what it might mean to expand the democratic reform agenda to 
reap the second-order effects on civil society of legislative policy-
making. 
I. AN ACCOUNTING OF DEMOCRATIC VICES AND (LATENT)
CIVIC VIRTUES
American civil society today is not well positioned to facilitate 
democratic accountability and responsiveness. For one, it suffers 
from unequal and unrepresentative citizen participation in all 
stages and forums of politics.37 For another, the differential organi-
zational capacity of different publics creates a chorus of interest 
groups in Washington (but also in state capitols) in which some 
voices are better heard than others.38 Most importantly, the decline 
since the middle of the twentieth century of both private-sector un-
ionism and class-integrated, mass-membership associations has 
compounded the effects of this unequal and unrepresentative par-
ticipation.39 Taken together, these three dynamics significantly un-
dercut the representativeness of political inputs into our democrat-
ic institutions, skewing policymaking in both legislatures and 
administrative agencies toward the interests of the wealthy. 
The George W. Bush administration’s failure to achieve the pri-
vatization of Social Security and Medicare—one of its signature 
                                                   
 37. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL 
POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 118 (2012) (preview-
ing finding that “neither active individuals nor active organizations represent all politically 
relevant segments of society equally”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See infra notes 130-173 and accompanying text. 
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campaign promises—nicely illustrates both the political vices and 
potential democratic virtues of American civil society. On the side 
of virtue, the invulnerability of Social Security and Medicare high-
lights the power of everyday Americans, when organized in effec-
tive civic associations, to achieve political responsiveness despite 
opposition from moneyed interests. The snag for the Bush admin-
istration (as for others since) has proved to be the AARP, whose 
political muscle derives from its 38 million members, who vote 
regularly in large numbers.40
At the same time, the sacred status of Social Security and Medi-
care illustrates the political vices of contemporary civil society and 
their contribution to imbalances in political influence.41 The 
AARP’s wins frequently come at the expense of the needs of 
younger Americans. Political participation of seniors (including 
those of middle to low socioeconomic status) is not matched by 
other groups.42 Meanwhile, civic associations with the AARP’s abil-
ity to represent, mobilize, and educate its members are scarce in 
contemporary civil society.43 As a consequence, the interests and 
perspectives of seniors are overrepresented in American politics.44
Seniors reap the rewards while the competing interests of younger 
Americans—e.g., affordable college or daycare—are routinely ig-
nored. 
The real lesson then is that our democratic institutions govern 
poorly when citizens are differentially and unequally organized in civ-
il society. And therein lies a fundamentally vicious political cycle: 
American policymakers are much more generous to those who are 
well-organized and participate (to seniors but more importantly to 
business and socioeconomic elites) than to those who remain un-
                                                   
 40. See Suzanne Mettler, The Transformed Welfare State and the Redistribution of Political 
Voice, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE 
OF CONSERVATISM 191, 211 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007) [hereinafter Mettler, 
Transformed Welfare State] (noting constant activism of senior citizens in the face of threats of 
retrenchment of benefits); Jacob S. Hacker et al., Inequality and Public Policy, in INEQUALITY 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN 200 (Lawrence 
R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005). 
 41. Cf. David Weigel, The Trailer: How Eight Years—and President Trump—Have  




 42. ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR POLITICAL 
ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 14–15, 25–37, 54 (2003) (noting that the par-
ticipation rates of lower and middle-class seniors are most marked when it comes to Social 
Security). 
 43. Id. at 78 (attributing finding that “[w]hen demographic characteristics and political 
interest are controlled for, AARP members are more likely than nonmembers to contact 
elected officials and to contact them about Social Security specifically”). 
 44. Id. at 15 (arguing that “the crucial feature of mass politics in the United States is . . . 
the participatory divergence of young and old”). 
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organized (young Americans, working families, or the poor) and 
on the political sidelines. This Part systematically lays out the ine-
qualities in political participation that contribute to the imbalance 
in political influence, as well as the historic transformations in the 
form of our civic associations that compound the effect. 
A. Unequal and Unrepresentative Political Participation 
American democracy has long suffered from a well-documented 
problem of unequal and unrepresentative political participation at 
all stages of political activity.45 But, unlike in the past, it is no longer 
tenable to dismiss the effect of unequal political participation on 
the grounds that those individuals who do participate are suffi-
ciently representative to underwrite the legitimacy of the political 
inputs into the system. 
1. As Citizens 
Unequal and unrepresentative individual participation at all 
stages of political activity is well documented.46 Apart from sen-
iors,47 the general rule is that individuals at the top of the socioec-
onomic ladder are much more likely to turn out on Election Day 
than those at the bottom. Since the early 1950s, approximately 
90% of those in the highest quintile of socioeconomic status (SES) 
have participated in every election; by contrast, participation in the 
lowest SES quintile has only broken the 60% mark a handful of 
times.48
Even when candidates and parties invest in mobilizing lower-
income and minority voters, the class bias in the electorate re-
mains. In 2008, for example, Americans with household incomes 
below the median made up only 38% of the electorate, despite 
representing 55% of the population; by contrast, individuals with 
incomes over $100,000 constituted 26% of the electorate, despite 
the fact that only 16% of the population has a household income 
                                                   
 45. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 147–262, 174 (noting that “[t]he ups and 
downs of participatory inequality do not seem to be related to other obvious factors—in par-
ticular, to growing economic inequality”). 
 46. See id. at 118. 
 47. Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 156, 189 (finding seniors to be “the one group for 
which a marked participatory bias favoring the affluent and educated does not exist”). 
 48. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 153 & fig. 6.1. 
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above $100,000.49 This class bias is significantly worse during mid-
terms and in state and local elections.50
Income is obviously not the only relevant characteristic when 
considering the representativeness of the electorate.51 That said, in 
recent years, the electorate has been significantly less racially un-
representative.52 To the degree racial inequalities in rates of politi-
cal participation persist, they are a product of disparities in educa-
tion and income.53 Indeed, African Americans, particularly women, 
vote at higher rates than their socioeconomic status would pre-
dict,54 and African-American youth, despite lower levels of income 
and education on average, are more civically and politically en-
gaged than their white counterparts.55 Meanwhile, traditional dif-
ferences in voter turnout by sex have dissipated, with voter turnout 
                                                   
 49. See Joe Soss & Lawrence R. Jacobs, The Place of Inequality: Non-participation in the 
American Polity, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 95, 97 (2009).
 50. See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 133; Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t Democ-
racy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 111 (2013); see also Asma Khalid, On the 
Sidelines of Democracy: Exploring Why So Many Americans Don’t Vote, MORNING EDITION (Sept. 
10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/645223716/on-the-sidelines-of-democracy-
exploring-why-so-many-americans-dont-vote (noting both that voter turnout is extremely and 
consistently low in midterm elections as well as the fact that those who do not turn out are 
significantly more likely to be lower income and less educated). It is worth acknowledging, 
however, that while the affluent are more likely to turn out in every state, the magnitude of 
participation gap varies significantly by state. See, e.g., Patrick Flavin, Does Higher Voter Turnout 
Among the Poor Lead to More Equal Representation?, 49 SOC. SCI. J. 405, 406, 410 (2012); Kim
Quaile Hill & Jan E. Leighley, The Policy Consequences of Class Bias in State Electorates, 36 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 351, 355 (1992).
 51. See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 216 & fig. 8.4; Elaine Kamarck & Alexander 
R. Podkul, The 2018 Primaries Project: The Demographics of Primary Voters, BROOKINGS INST.
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-2018-primaries-project-the-
demographics-of-primary. 
 52. U.S. Election Project, Voter Turnout Demographics, http://www.electproject.org/
home/voter-turnout/demographics (depicting trends from 1984–2018); see also Jens Manuel 
Krogstad et al., Historic Highs in 2018 Voter Turnout Extended Across Racial and Ethnic Groups,
PEW RES. CTR. (May 1, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/01/historic-
highs-in-2018-voter-turnout-extended-across-racial-and-ethnic-groups/; Jens Manuel 
Krogstad and Mark Hugo Lopez, Black Voter Turnout Fell in 2016, Even as a Record Number of 
Americans Cast Ballots, PEW RES. CTR. (May 12, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/05/12/black-voter-turnout-fell-in-2016-even-as-a-record-number-of-americans-
cast-ballots/. 
 53. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 231 (noting that “[t]he disparity in participa-
tion between African Americans and Anglo whites disappears when racial differences in ed-
ucation and income are taken into account”). 
 54. See Allison P. Anoll, What Makes a Good Neighbor? Race, Place, and Norms of Political 
Participation, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 494, 495–96, 500 (2018) (reviewing studies that find 
“that when controlling for individual-level resources like income and education, Black 
Americans often outperform Whites in models of voting” and hypothesizing that this may be 
because African Americans value those who are politically active, as voters and protestors, 
significantly more than white Americans do). 
 55. Jonathan F. Zaff et al., An Inequitable Invitation to Citizenship: Non-College-Bound Youth 
and Civic Engagement at 10 PACE (Oct. 2009) (noting that “African-American youth . . . sur-
pass whites on most measures of civic engagement, due, at least in some part, to traditions, 
norms, and institutions that promote participation in the Black community”). 
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rates for women, particularly African-American and Latino women, 
consistently higher compared to men.56
Age, however, remains a critical source of bias in the electorate,57
especially during midterm elections.58 A recent review of validated 
voters in the 2016 election found that “compared with validated 
voters, nonvoters were more likely to be younger, less educated, 
less affluent, and nonwhite.”59 Underscoring the significance of 
nonparticipation, the study also found that they were much more 
likely to affiliate with the Democratic Party.60 This same study 
found that “[j]ust 13% of validated voters in 2016 were younger 
than 30” as compared to 33% of nonvoters.61
The 2018 midterms did mark a significant improvement, with 
the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and 
Engagement estimating that 31% of youth (ages 18 to 29) turned 
out to vote in the 2018 midterms.62 That said, optimism should be 
tempered because the youth share of the vote was 9%, as com-
pared to 32% for those over 65.63 Another reason for caution is that 
upticks in youth turnout are often disproportionately driven by the 
                                                   
 56. Hannah Hartig, FACT TANK: In Year of Record Midterm Turnout, Women Continued to 
Vote at Higher Rates than Men, PEW RES. CTR. (May 3, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/03/in-year-of-record-midterm-turnout-
women-continued-to-vote-at-higher-rates-than-men/; see also Stephen Ansolabehere & Eitan 
Hersh, Gender, Race and Voting: A Research Note, 1 POL. & GOVERNANCE 132 (2013) (using a 
national sample of 1.9 million registrants to show that women registered and voted at higher 
rates than men, in 2008, and that black women voted at a higher rate than white men, in 
order to reveal methodological shortcomings of standard approaches to measuring rates of 
turnout); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 231 (explaining that “[t]he gap in activity 
between women and men can be fully explained by gender differences in education, in-
come, civic skills, and political engagement”). 
 57. Asma Khalid, Millennials Now Rival Baby Boomers as a Political Force, but Will They Ac-
tually Vote?, NPR (May 16, 2016, 2:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/05/16/478237882/
millennials-now-rival-boomers-as-a-political-force-but-will-they-actually-vote. 
 58. CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 29 (reviewing trends from 1959–1998 and showing that 
seniors, because of increases in participation, are now “more than twice as likely to vote in 
midterm elections as those under 35”).  
 59. An Examination of the 2016 Electorate, Based on Validated Voters, PEW RES. CTR.
(Aug. 9, 2018), http://www.people-press.org/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-
electorate-based-on-validated-voters/ (providing a visual graphic comparing demographics 
of voters and nonvoters). 
 60. Id.
 61. Id.
 62. Young People Dramatically Increase Their Turnout to 31%, Shape 2018 Midterm Elections,
CIRCLE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://civicyouth.org/young-people-dramatically-increase-their-
turnout-31-percent-shape-2018-midterm-elections/. In 2016, youth turnout was around 50%. 
William A. Galston & Clara Hendrikson, How Millennials Voted this Election, BROOKINGS INST.
(Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/11/21/how-millennials-
voted/. 
 63. Matthew Yglesias, The 2018 Electorate Was Older, Whiter, and Better Educated Than in 
2016, VOX (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/12/
18083014/2018-election-results-turnout. See generally Understanding Voting Data: Youth Turnout 
vs. Youth Share, CIRCLE (Nov. 1, 2018), https://civicyouth.org/understanding-voting-data-
youth-turnout-vs-youth-share/. 
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behavior of college-bound youth from higher-income families and 
communities.64 Non-college bound youth, however, comprise about 
50% of the population aged 15 to 29 years old.65 Finally, differen-
tial turnout between age groups is partly attributable to the natural 
life-cycle,66 posing a bona fide risk that over attention to the inter-
ests of older citizens is difficult to offset.67
The unrepresentativeness of political participation is even more 
pronounced among volunteers and donors to political cam-
paigns.68 A 2016 study of campaign contributors documents that 
the bulk of money coming into campaign coffers is donated by in-
dividuals who are disproportionately wealthy, white, male, and 
old.69 These statistics are troubling because the prevalence of un-
competitive elections creates significant pressure on elected offi-
cials to be particularly solicitous to the views of donors and cam-
paign activists, above those of their constituents.70
Finally, inequality is not limited to the electoral sphere: it shapes 
all aspects of political participation. From contacting members of 
Congress, to participating in political marches, lower-income 
Americans are significantly less likely to engage in American poli-
                                                   
 64. Cf. Zaff et al., supra note 55, at 6–7, 22 (reporting that “[i]ncreases in voting, volun-
teering, and other forms of civic engagement are driven disproportionately by young people 
from higher-income families and communities,” while lamenting that “[t]he bulk of get-out-
the-vote efforts are focused on college campuses” or target low-income youth who are col-
lege-bound).  
 65. Id. at 7. The study’s figure is consistent with what we know about college comple-
tion despite the fact that the author’s suggestion that the high rate is driven by the fact that 
one in four students do not complete high school is not credible. Current census data shows 
the percentage of Americans without a high school degree at just under 10 percent, and 
others estimate high school drop out rates at about 4%. Compare U.S. Census Bureau, Press 
Release: Highest Educational Levels Reached by Adults in the U.S. Since 1940 (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2017/cb17-51.html (reporting that, in 
2016, among those “25 years and older, 89.1 percent had completed high school (or equiva-
lent) or more education”) with NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, Fast Facts: Dropout Rates,
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=16 (lasted visited Nov. 18, 2019) (reporting 
that “[t]he overall . . . dropout rate [defined as “the percentage of 16- to 24-year-olds . . . 
who are not enrolled in school and have not earned a high school credential”] decreased 
from 9.7 percent in 2006 to 5.4 percent in 2017”). 
 66. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 209. 
 67. Id. at 209, 231 (“Life-cycle differences seem to persist even after controlling for a 
large number of factors.”). 
 68. Id. at 157–62. 
 69. See Sean McElwee, Whose Voice, Whose Choice? The Distorting Influence of the Political 
Donor Class in Our Big-Money Elections, DEMOS (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.demos.org/research/whose-voice-whose-choice-distorting-influence-political-
donor-class-our-big-money. 
 70. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 251 (noting the incentives elected officials 
have to keep “the activists who provide the volunteer labor and dollars that make campaigns 
possible” happy and the ways that “[t]he need to pay attention to high-SES opinionated 
campaign activists has the potential both to tilt public policy away from the needs of the 
median voter”). 
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tics as compared to wealthier citizens.71 Recent protest participa-
tion offers one measure: those who engaged in protest marches in 
the first two years of the Trump presidency were better educated 
and more affluent than their fellow Americans, on average.72
The critical point, however, is that it is no longer tenable to dis-
miss these inequalities on the grounds that those who participate 
are sufficiently representative to underwrite the legitimacy of the 
political inputs into the system.73 In their seminal 2012 study, Kay 
Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady found that 
as compared to active voters, inactive voters are not only much 
more likely to report struggling to pay bills, obtain healthcare, and 
find decent housing, but also much more likely to have utilized 
public benefit programs.74 Similar differences are evident among 
individuals active in politics. Those with more “limited income and 
education . . . [are] considerably more likely” to raise concerns 
about basic needs such as “poverty, jobs, health, [and] housing.”75
                                                   
 71. See Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 97 (noting further that “[c]ompared to wealthi-
er citizens, lower income Americans tend to vote at lower rates and to participate less in a 
variety of other political behaviors, including writing letters to members of Congress and 
protesting”). 
 72. Mary Jordan & Scott Clement, In Reaction to Trump, Millions of Americans Are Joining 
Protests and Getting Political, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/national/wp/2018/04/06/feature/in-reaction-to-trump-millions-of-americans-are-
joining-protests-and-getting-political/?utm_term=.8a283d45f4d5 (reporting that 44% of par-
ticipants were at least 50 years old, 36% earned more than $100,000, and a large portion 
lived in the suburbs); Sarah Kaplan, A Scientist Who Studies Protest Says ‘The Resistance’ Isn’t 
Slowing Down, WASH. POST (May 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-
of-science/wp/2017/05/03/a-scientist-who-studies-protest-says-the-resistance-isnt-slowing-
down/?utm_term=.ae1c47a9f838 (reporting that “[m]ore than three-quarters of partici-
pants at [the Women’s March, the March for Science, and the People’s Climate March] had 
at least a bachelor’s degree” and “53 percent [of those at the Women’s March] had a gradu-
ate or professional degree” ). Nationally, only about one in three Americans hold a bache-
lor’s degree. See U.S. Census Bureau, Press Release: Highest Educational Levels Reached by 
Adults in the U.S. Since 1940 (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/2017/cb17-51.html (announcing 2016 Current Population Survey Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement found 33.4 percent of adult Americans hold a bachelor’s degree 
and report incomes approximately $30,000 higher than Americans who hold only a high 
school diploma on average). That said, this generalization may not hold for African Ameri-
cans and Latinos, who tend to value grassroots political participation, including protest par-
ticipation, more than Whites. Whether viewing such practices as critical to gaining equal 
citizenship translates into higher rates of protest participation is, however, less clear. See
Anoll, supra note 54, at 495, 498 (finding that Blacks and Latinos “are more likely than 
Whites to value political rallies, especially their ability to transform their communities for 
the better”). 
 73. See John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Are Voters Better Represented?, 67 J. POL. 1206, 
1213–14, 1221, 1223 (2005) (concluding that “[w]hether or not a conservatively biased elec-
torate can help elect a Republican, it seems to move Senators’ roll-call votes in a conserva-
tive direction”). But see Emily Badger, What if Everyone Voted? Or at Least Voted at Equal Rates.,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/upshot/what-if-
everyone-voted.html (reporting on new data showing that even who is elected would likely 
change if the electorate were more representative). 
 74. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 126–29. 
 75. Id. at 132. 
80 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:1 
The result, as Schlozman and her colleagues note, is that “public 
officials are likely to “hear[] less about . . . matters” of significance 
to the socioeconomically disadvantaged because they are broadly 
inactive in politics.76
Who participates in politics—and more importantly who does 
not—matters a great deal for policymaking.77 A threshold level of 
representative political participation at the individual level is nec-
essary not only to legitimize the system but to ensure a measure of 
accountability and responsiveness. Thus, the overrepresentation of 
socioeconomic elites among individuals who participate politically 
creates an electorate with views much closer to those of moneyed 
interests than those of the eligible electorate.78 The fact is that even 
as Americans do not like to discuss class, Americans from different 
socioeconomic backgrounds exhibit different preferences with re-
spect to economic policies (from welfare spending to taxes) and 
different cultural sensibilities.79 The underrepresentation of young 
citizens creates similar problems. Young Americans by and large 
support gay marriage, hold a broad conception of sexual harass-
ment, recognize the persistence of racial discrimination, embrace 
diversity, and generally have more liberal outlooks as compared to 
their elders.80 Young Americans overwhelmingly identify with the 
Democratic Party, while older Americans are more evenly divided 
                                                   
 76. Id.
 77. Id. at 118 (previewing finding that “activity by both citizens and organized interests 
makes a difference for public policy, and, if anything, public officials are disproportionately 
responsive to the affluent and well-educated members of their constituencies”); see also id. at 
141–44 (reviewing literature on relationship of public input to policy responsiveness). But see
Stuart N. Soroka & Christopher Wlezien, On the Limits to Inequality in Representation, 41 PS:
POL. SCI. & POL. 319, 321, 323–24 (2008) (arguing that the policy consequences of unequal 
representation are insignificant because only rarely—such as in relation to tax and welfare 
policy—do low and high-income Americans differ in their policy preferences). 
 78. See Benjamin I. Page & Cari Lynn Hennessy, What Affluent Americans Want from 
Politics 8–11 (Sept. 2–5, 2010) (APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper) (finding more differ-
ences between the political preferences of the top 4% of income earners and those of lower-
income Americans, than between the top 33% of income earners and those of lower-income 
Americans, especially with respect to economic policy); see also Jeffrey A. Winters & Benja-
min I. Page, Oligarchy in the United States?, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 731, 738 (2009).
 79. See, e.g., Most See Inequality Growing, but Partisans Differ over Solutions at 8, PEW RES.
CTR. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/01/23/most-see-inequality-
growing-but-partisans-differ-over-solutions/ (finding significant differences between the 
views of those with family incomes of less than $30,000 and those with family incomes of at 
least $75,000, especially with respect to redistributive policies). 
 80. Kim Parker et al., Generation Z Looks a Lot Like Millennials on Key Social and Political 
Issues, PEW RES. CTR. (2019), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/3/2019/01/Generations-full-report_FINAL_1.18.pdf; accord PEW RES. CTR., The Genera-
tion Gap in American Politics (2018), http://www.people-press.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/4/2018/03/03-01-18-Generations-release2.pdf (noting, in particular, that Re-
publicans in this generation differ from their older counterparts in being more aware of 
ongoing racial discrimination, valuing racial and ethnic diversity, seeking government solu-
tions to social problems, and attributing climate change to human activity).  
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in their party allegiances.81 They also have different priorities with 
respect to government spending from older Americans, who (un-
surprisingly) prioritize maintaining Social Security and Medicare 
over government spending on either K-12 or higher education.82
2. Of Organizations 
Unequal and unrepresentative participation in politics extends 
beyond individuals to organizations. Despite the plethora of public 
interest organizations, the chorus of interest groups in American 
politics is not representative of the full spectrum of interests. This 
skews political inputs once again. Its significance is magnified to 
the extent that individual political participation, even if repre-
sentative, cannot create an effective counterweight to elite interests 
in the absence of organizations. 
The most salient axis of organizational inequality in the New 
Gilded Age is economic. For one, business and other economic in-
terests are much better organized than those of citizens.83 For an-
other, critical economic interests—those of part-time workers, par-
ents of young children, and the beneficiaries of means-tested 
federal programs—essentially lack a presence in Washington.84
Indeed, it is beyond dispute that “the voices of advocates for 
broad publics and the less privileged are . . . muted” in the chorus 
of American interest group politics.85 In their 2012 longitudinal 
study of federal interest groups, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 
document the various inequalities that shape the so-called “un-
heavenly chorus” of interest group politics.86 First and foremost, 
their work confirms what has been long recognized: the bulk of 
civic groups engaging with Congress represent American business 
interests.87 Altogether, “more than half, 53 percent, [of all organi-
                                                   
 81. PEW RES. CTR., Wide Gender Gap, Growing Educational Divide in Voters’ Party Identifica-
tion (2018), http://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/03/03-20-18-
Party-Identification-CORRECTED.pdf (reporting that “nearly six-in-ten Millennials (59%) 
affiliate with the Democratic Party or lean Democratic, compared with about half of Gen 
Xers and Boomers (48% each) and 43% of voters in the Silent Generation”).
 82. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 205–09. 
 83. See Gilens & Page, supra note 9, at 572. 
 84. See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 344. 
 85. Id. at 443. 
 86. The quantitative study is based on an analysis of organizations listed in the 1981, 
1991, 2001, and 2006 Washington Representatives directory. Id. at 317. The data set does not 
include organizations that only have a presence in state and local politics. Id. at 318. 
 87. Id. at 657; Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., Inequalities of Political Voice, in INEQUALITY 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN 19, 53 (Law-
rence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005) (reviewing literature and concluding that 
“[t]he set of organized political interests continues to be organized principally around eco-
nomic matters . . . and to be dominated by business and the professions”). 
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zations active in Washington] represent business in one way or an-
other.”88
Second, most of the groups engaged in politics in Washington 
represent institutional interests, not people.89 Associations with in-
dividual (as opposed to organizational) members constitute only 
about an eighth of the groups engaged in Washington politics.90
Despite their market share, such groups are disproportionately in-
volved in critical policymaking debates.91 Still, with fewer resources 
they are often “spread thin” in their efforts and struggle to set the 
legislative agenda.92
Third, these groups do not represent the full swath of citizens’ 
interests.93 Indeed, the underrepresentation of the interests of low- 
to middle-income Americans among the citizen groups that do ex-
ist is one of the most troubling features of interest group politics 
today. Americans of lower socioeconomic status are significantly 
less likely to belong to an organization that takes a stand on public 
issues, as compared to their higher SES counterparts.94
In this regard, two findings in the Schlozman study are particu-
larly shocking from an equity and inclusion perspective. First, “un-
less they are members of unions, those whose work is unskilled 
have no occupational associations at all to represent their interests 
in Washington.”95 The bulk of America’s low-skill workers—
“bellhops, telemarketers, hotel desk clerks, laundry workers, bus 
drivers, bartenders, custodians, bank tellers, or tool and die mak-
ers”—have no means of influencing Washington politics, unless 
they happen to be unionized.96 During the period of the study, 
“more than 90 million American workers [were employed] in 
nonprofessional and nonmanagerial occupations.”97 To be sure, 
                                                   
 88. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 322. 
 89. Id. at 265, 319 (noting that “the majority of organizations active in political life have 
no members in the usual sense of the word”).  
 90. Id. at 319–20 & tab. 11.2 (reporting that, in 2001, “only 12 percent of the organiza-
tions listed in the Washington Representatives directory were associations of individuals”).  
 91. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO
LOSES, AND WHY 10–11 (2009) (arguing that “[c]itizen groups are . . . more important to 
policy debates than simple numbers would indicate because, like unions, they tend to be 
active and recognized as major players on many issues”). 
 92. Id. at 11, 13. 
 93. Id.
 94. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 23, at 140 (reporting a one-third difference in likeli-
hood).
 95. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 328, 346. 
 96. Id. (noting that “other than unions, there are no occupational associations at all to 
organize those who labor at low-skill jobs”). 
 97. Id. at 328. In 2014, “about 10 percent of the active workforce . . . were self-
employed” (approximately 14.6 million people) and an additional 29.4 million worked for 
self-employed individuals. Drew DeSilver, 10 Facts About American Workers, PEW RES.
CTR. (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/01/8-facts-about-
american-workers/.
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some of these low-skill workers are represented by unions. That 
said, the proportion of the American workforce that is unionized 
has declined to a mere 10.5%, with private-sector unionism falling 
to closer to 6.4%.98
Second, organizations that advocate for the poor are virtually 
nonexistent.99 In fact, during the time period under study, “there 
[was] not a single organization that [brought] together recipients 
of means-tested government benefits such as Medicaid [to] act[] 
on their own behalf.”100 The over 70 million Americans who de-
pend on Medicaid and CHIP must rely on professional organiza-
tions to advocate on their behalf—organizations that, by their own 
reports, are woefully inept at incorporating beneficiaries.101
The story is markedly different for higher SES Americans. Those 
whose work requires a college degree are much more likely to be-
long to a membership organization representing their profes-
sion.102 Indeed, professionals—whether “criminal defense lawyers, 
plant physiologists, landscape architects, [or] historians”—are ex-
tremely well organized.103 Schlozman and her colleagues found half 
of the groups representing individuals on the basis of their occupa-
tion are associations of professionals.104 Individuals with higher lev-
els of educational attainment are also “much more likely than 
                                                   
 98. Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release: Union Members—2018 (Jan. 19, 2019) 
(noting that the percentage represents about 14.7 million Americans and constitutes a de-
cline in nearly 10 percent and 3 million union workers since 1983, the closest year for which 
there are comparable figures). 
 99. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 325–26, 327. 
 100. Id. at 321 & tab. 11.3, 346 (study is of a twenty-five-year period using complete data 
on organizations in Washington directory for five discrete years). 
 101. JAMILA MICHENER, FRAGMENTED DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID, FEDERALISM, AND UNEQUAL 
POLITICS 1152–56 (2018) (reporting that “the role of actual beneficiaries in shaping the ad-
vocacy of professional organizations . . . was woefully limited”); see also id. at 11 (noting that 
“[a]s of 2017, more than 70 million Americans had health coverage through Medicaid”). 
For more recent statistics on Medicaid and CHIP see October 2018 Medicaid & CHIP Enroll-
ment Data Highlights, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-
information/medicaid-and-chip-enrollment-data/report-highlights/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2019). The significance of this lack of representation is magnified when one notes 
that, by some estimates, 40% of American children depend on means-tested federal pro-
grams for healthcare. See Rachel West & Katherine Gallagher Robbins, Who Receives  
Medicaid? A State-by-State Breakdown, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (July 20, 2017),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/news/2017/07/20/436243/receives-
medicaid-state-state-breakdown/; see also Nicki Lisa Cole, Who Really Receives Welfare and Gov-
ernment Entitlements, THOUGHTCO.COM (July 13, 2018), https://www.thoughtco.com/who-
really-receives-welfare-4126592. 
 102. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 325–26, 327 (reporting that “those who do 
work that requires high levels of education—and, to a lesser extent, confers high levels of 
income—are very likely to be represented by an organization in Washington”). 
 103. Id.
 104. Id. at 327 (noting further that a large proportion of groups organized around iden-
tity politics represent the interests of professionals from that group). 
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those lower down to be affiliated with a political organization”105 and 
to report having taken an active leadership role within those politi-
cal organizations.106 All these facts “reinforce the upper-class accent 
of the heavenly chorus.”107
Finally, and least surprisingly, the number of Americans involved 
in groups associated with public goods, such as clean water or safer 
streets, “is far smaller than the proportion who would benefit from 
those conditions.”108 While it is not shocking that the interest 
groups that exist underrepresent broad but diffuse interests in 
public goods,109 this too has obvious and unfortunate implications 
for policymaking. 
In all, these associational inequalities significantly hamper the 
capacity of American civil society to demand responsiveness to the 
interests of everyday Americans. While the organizational ad-
vantages of business and economic interests do not guarantee their 
success, it does give them the upper hand when it comes to legisla-
tive priorities.110 Indeed, a seminal study questioning the dogma 
that moneyed interests inevitably prevail in Washington attributes 
the “conspicuous . . . paucity of issues relating to the poor and to 
the economic security of working-class Americans” on the legisla-
tive agenda to the fact that these groups lack an organizational seat 
at the table.111
                                                   
 105. Id. at 377; see also id. at 378 & figs. 13.2 & 13.2 (emphasis added) (further summariz-
ing that “[w]hen we restrict our purview to members of political organizations, we find that, 
compared to those in the lowest SES quintile, those in the highest quintile are nearly twice 
as likely to have attended a meeting, nearly three times as likely to have been active, and 
more than three times as likely to have served on the board or as an officer”). 
 106. Id. at 380 (“Not only are the well-educated and affluent more likely to be affiliated 
with political organizations, but, even among members, they are also more likely to be active 
in those organizations and to serve on the board or as officers.”). 
 107. Id. at 346, 380 (concluding that “the economically disadvantaged are underrepre-
sented in pressure politics”). 
 108. Id. at 54. 
 109. It is well-established that classic collective action dilemmas, most particularly those 
associated with transaction costs and free-ridership, pose significant barriers to the for-
mation of organizations to represent diffuse interests. Id. at 278, 316, 345 (noting, further, 
that the “formal presentation of the free rider problem often miss the differences among 
constituencies in their ability to bear those costs” and thus the ways that “resource con-
straints have a powerful impact on which voices are heard through the medium of collective 
advocacy”). 
 110. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 91, at 16, 25 (2009) (concluding that wealth is not 
a good predictor of policy success largely because of two factors: first, the status quo bias, 
and, second, the fact that most policies implicate competing economic interests); see also id. 
at 240 (acknowledging that the status quo “already” incorporates the substantial “biases . . . 
inherent in the system of interest-group mobilization”). 
 111. Id. at 255–58 (noting, further, the divergence between the issues that organizational 
interests seek to place on the legislative agenda through lobbying and the public’s priori-
ties). 
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B. From Elks to Policy Wonks:  
The Shifting Structure of Civic Associations 
Everyday citizens must be organized to demand responsive-
ness.112 Indeed, influencing legislative priorities and executive poli-
cymaking requires the presence of powerful civic associations.113 In 
this regard, the structural weakness of contemporary civil society 
goes well beyond uneven representation. It also lies in the form of 
that representation: for the most part, civic groups that represent 
the interests of ordinary Americans are no longer capable of sus-
taining civic engagement in ways that produce responsiveness and 
enforce accountability. This in turn reinforces the political distor-
tion that arises out of the long-standing problem that not all inter-
ests in the United States participate equally as individuals or 
through organizations. 
1. Participatory Civic Associations of the Mid-Twentieth Century 
Understanding this claim requires a clear picture of what Amer-
ican civil society looked like before the great social movements of 
the twentieth century. Until the early 1970s, American civil society 
was dominated by unions but also by federated organizations with 
dues-paying members from working- and middle-class house-
holds.114 While formed for nonpolitical ends, unions and associa-
tions, from the American Legion and Knights of Labor to the Na-
tional Congress of Mothers, fostered democratic participation and 
responsiveness in myriad ways. Without minimizing that most of 
these organizations partook of racial exclusion and sex-
segregation, comprehending their political virtues is critical to any 
effort to rebuild the political muscle of ordinary Americans. 
                                                   
 112. Cf. Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nom-
inations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571, 577–78 (2012) (identifying a large “blind 
spot” with respect to information about official behavior, which renders ordinary voters in-
capable of holding politicians accountable through monitoring). 
 113. See GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE, supra note 11, at 121–23 (noting that where 
“poor and middle-income Americans have powerful [civic] allies” they have been able to 
maintain social welfare programs). 
 114. THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIFE 153–57, tbl. 4.3 (2003) (documenting the decline in membership in 
classic mid-twentieth-century federated civic associations—sex-segregated ones, such as the 
American Legion, the American Bowling Congress and the General Federation of Women’s 
Clubs, as well as those that were gender integrated, such as the PTO and the Scouts); see also 
id. at 163–71 (arguing that while the evidence is mixed, it is unlikely that membership has 
simply transferred to more locally oriented face-to-face groups); accord PUTNAM, BOWLING 
ALONE, supra note 31, at 30–35 (finding a drop off in small face-to-face civic organizations 
after the 1960s as fewer individuals opted to join such groups). 
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First, the face-to-face and personal quality of participation in the 
civic associations that dominated American civil society from the 
Civil War to the middle of the twentieth century fueled both civic 
engagement and political power. This is because relationships and 
social networks drive political recruitment and mobilization far 
more than ideology and belief.115 While money, education, civic 
skills, and political interest all play a significant role,116 empirical 
research consistently finds that individuals are much more likely to 
respond to calls for political action if they have a social connec-
tion—even a distant one—to the person making the ask.117 Indeed, 
some researchers attribute the higher rates of political participa-
tion among those with higher levels of educational attainment to 
the fact that they are more likely “to be located in the social net-
works through which requests for political activity are mediated.”118
Similarly, the exceptional political participation of seniors is par-
tially attributable to the frequency with which they are mobilized 
by political parties and others.119
A second significant source of political strength for civic groups 
formed after the Civil War was that “virtually all [local] chapters 
included men or women of different occupational and class back-
grounds.”120 A study of veterans of World War II is revealing in this 
regard. It found that even among veterans with graduate educa-
tion, only half of their civic memberships were in elite professional 
groups.121 The other half of the groups they joined, upon returning 
home, included members of various socioeconomic classes.122
                                                   
115. See Henry H. Brady et al., Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation, 89 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 271, 285 (1995) (concluding that “motivations such as interest in politics are 
not enough to explain political participation”). 
116. For an overview of these individual factors as well as different approaches to ex-
plaining political participation, see id. at 271, and MICHENER, supra note 101, at 26–27, fig. 
2.1.
117. See SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 3–4 (1995) (finding that “[t]hose who have both the motivation and the capacity 
to become active are more likely to do so if they are asked” and further that motivation and 
capacity themselves arise out of social experiences, institutions, and associations); see also
Florence Passy, Social Networks Matter. But How?, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND NETWORKS:
RELATIONAL APPROACHES TO COLLECTIVE ACTION 21, 24, 34 (Mario Diani & Doug McAdam 
eds., 2003) (reviewing literature showing that a primary path by which individuals disposed 
to take political action are connected to opportunities to do so is through social ties).
 118. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 150. 
 119. CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 74 (noting that “one reason they vote at high rates is 
that they are mobilized by political parties during election season”); see also id. at 78 (on 
mobilization effects of the AARP). 
 120. SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 108; see also id. at 110 (noting further that biographies 
of prominent businessmen, politicians, professionals and wives often involved long accounts 
of their membership in the same civic associations that record numbers of ordinary Ameri-
cans joined as well). 
 121. SUZANNE METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS: THE G.I. BILL AND THE MAKING OF THE 
GREATEST GENERATION 129 (2005) [hereinafter METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS] (reporting 
further that “[o]nly about 20 percent of veterans with college or graduate education were 
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The resulting socioeconomically integrated social networks pro-
vided breadth to potential social and political movements. In addi-
tion, membership in such groups served to ground political elites 
in the experiences of their fellow Americans. Because political suc-
cess depended on building a broad political network, bound by 
personal ties, starting at home, “leaders and would-be leaders, no 
matter how privileged in the larger society” were forced “to inter-
act with a wide range of their fellow citizens.”123 In this way, the par-
ticipatory structures of the associations of the past “encouraged a 
two-way linkage between members and leaders,” even as they were 
sex-segregated and racially exclusionary.124
Third, most civic groups were democratically governed. Demo-
cratic governance served multiple civic-capacity building functions. 
It facilitated the development of important skills. Weekly and 
monthly meetings of the local chapter had to be organized. Indi-
viduals were asked to run for offices within the group, to vote, and 
to participate in the federated structure if elected. This too en-
couraged the development of civic habits. Equally important, given 
the socioeconomic inclusiveness of membership, these civic skills 
frequently accrued to individuals without high levels of educational 
attainment, and—since there were parallel groups—to women and 
African Americans as well.125
Finally, the fact that internal governance structures were mod-
eled on the U.S. Constitution meant everyday Americans were so-
cialized into the representative, deliberative, and organizational 
practices of democracy as well as into its republican values.126 It also 
meant that most organizations operated through a federated struc-
ture, thereby augmenting their political potential by providing 
both state-wide and national presence. 
Unions, though neither socioeconomically integrated nor for-
mally federated, achieved similar civic capacity by linking local 
units into a national operation. Organized around worksites, un-
ions also capitalized on social ties to mobilize workers and to gain 
access to elected officials and party leaders.127 Meanwhile, their in-
ternal governance structures fostered civic and political skills 
among non-college educated and lower middle-class members. As 
                                                   
active only in organizations with other elites, while fully 80 percent or more counted cross-
class organizations among their memberships”). 
 122. Id.
 123. SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 108; see also id. at 113 (noting that, in the absence of 
the mass media, men aspiring to political power “necessarily participated in and . . . buil[t] 
extensive interpersonal networks not confined to particular occupational or social circles”). 
 124. Id. at 108. 
 125. Id; see also SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 48. 
 126. SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 98–115.  
 127. ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 157. 
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Jake Rosenfeld summarizes, “[unions] boosted the political partic-
ipation of non-elites, giving voice to the policy preferences of the 
working and middle class.”128
In all, the federated, membership-based, voluntary associations 
and unions that existed through the mid-twentieth century, despite 
their vices, offered an invaluable democratic virtue: they advanced 
a cycle of civic mindedness, political engagement, and policy re-
sponsiveness.129
2. Contemporary Civic Associations as  
Professional Advocacy Groups 
American civil society looks quite different today. Economic and 
social changes since the 1970s have radically shifted the structure 
and texture of our civic associations. National networks of mem-
bership-based associations that fostered an active form of civic and 
political engagement have largely been replaced by policy-shops 
located in major metropolitan areas, staffed by professionals, and 
focused on national politics. Meanwhile, economic and political 
changes have significantly reduced the scale and power of unions, 
especially in the private sector. These shifts have had profound po-
litical consequences. 
Although the precise dynamics are contested,130 membership 
levels in federated organizations fell precipitously starting in the 
1970s.131 A key study by Theda Skocpol finds that membership in 
the federated, socioeconomically integrated associations long at 
the center of American civil society has dropped by 60%, as com-
pared to a 28% drop among professional societies.132 Even veter-
ans’ groups were not immune.133
The tenor of contemporary civic associations is one of profes-
sional management and foundation support.134 Typically, these 
                                                   
 128. Id. at 181. 
 129. SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 117–24. 
 130. The most prominent debate regarding the cause has been between Robert Putnam 
and Theda Skocpol. Putnam attributes the lion’s share of the change to generational re-
placement. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 31, at 266–73. Skocpol, however, is 
skeptical that generational change can account for the abruptness of the shift. In her view, 
change was due in significant part to social changes which made the racist and sex-
segregated traditions of these groups increasingly off-putting to potential young members.
See SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 175, 178–82. 
 131. SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 212–19, figs. 5.9 & 5.10. 
 132. Id.
 133. Id. at 175, 178–82 (arguing that the nature of the conflict in Vietnam and the am-
bivalence about the war at home undercut the appeal of veterans’ associations to those re-
turning from Southeast Asia). 
 134. SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 224. 
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groups are heavily staffed and bureaucratically run even when they 
formally have members.135 While some estimate that a quarter of 
local civic groups remain affiliated with federated national organi-
zations,136 members rarely have formal opportunities to choose 
leaders or decide policy priorities.137 Instead, membership is largely 
confined to periodic monetary donations.138
In part, this shift can be explained by changes in the political 
economy of civil society that undermined the incentives for organ-
izations to invest in building a grassroots membership or cultivat-
ing leaders out of those members. Pulled toward litigating in the 
courts and lobbying in Washington, civic groups have moved away 
from both local community engagement and electoral politics 
since the 1970s.139 Meanwhile, their legislative successes and the in-
creased availability of grants to subsidize movement organizations 
spurred the professionalization of such groups.140 Even those fed-
erated civic associations that have been founded since the 1970s, 
such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving, do not necessarily depend 
on local membership dues.141 Groups abandoned the practice of 
shared governance with regular meetings, volunteers, and locally 
cultivated leaders, and lost the socioeconomic integration of the 
membership base that remained. Indeed, a recent study of civic as-
sociations that engaged in Washington politics found that only one 
in eight was “a classic voluntary association.”142
To be sure, participatory membership-based groups, including 
the National Lawyers Guild and the League of Women Voters, 
have persisted,143 and new membership-based groups—such as the 
                                                   
 135. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 31, at 51 (remarking that “membership . . . 
means moving a pen, not making a meeting”). 
 136. John D. McCarthy, Persistence and Change Among Nationally Federated Social Movements,
in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 193, 205–06 (Gerald F. Davis et al., 
eds., 2005) (estimating, based on a variety of sources, that approximately 25% of local social 
movement organizations founded in any given time period are affiliated with national 
groups, while acknowledging there has been “a trend toward the founding of nonmember-
ship” civic groups since 1979). 
 137. Id. at 206–10; cf. id. at 214–19 (articulating the incentives and strategies to control 
local chapters that are available to the national headquarters of contemporary federated 
organizations). 
 138. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 31, at 51. 
 139. SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 200–02, 206–10. 
 140. Id.
 141. See McCarthy, supra note 136, at 214–15, 222 (noting, for example, that local chap-
ters of Mothers Against Drunk Driving generally sought only to secure the requisite number 
of members (20) to qualify as a chapter). 
 142. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 319–20 & tab. 11.2. Many of these organiza-
tions tend to be extremely important in policy debates.  
 143. Kenneth T. Andrews et al., Leadership, Membership, and Voice: Civic Associations that 
Work, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1191, 1193 (2010) (noting that “not all civic associations are in de-
cline” and further that “an estimated 25% of all local social movement organizations in the 
United States” are affiliated with federated groups). 
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Kensington Welfare Rights Union—have been founded since the 
1970s, particularly at the local level.144 Still, these groups typically 
lack the numbers and national scale of their mid-twentieth century 
counterparts. The YMCA is one notable exception. The organiza-
tion has maintained extensive membership and national scale, 
while maintaining significant face-to-face opportunities.145 To date, 
however, its political potential has remained largely untapped. 
That said, a few local YMCA chapters have ventured into encourag-
ing voter registration. 
Those groups that have maintained a political presence at a na-
tional scale, such as the AARP, National Rifle Association (NRA), 
and Sierra Club, are often hybrids—combining a membership as-
sociation that includes face-to-face participatory opportunities with 
a D.C. policy-based shop run by professional staff.146 It is striking 
that, as with their predecessors, these groups generally include a 
recreational element. 
The Sierra Club, for example, has two national offices and 27 
regional offices.147 In 2003, it had a membership of 750,000, orga-
nized in 62 chapters with 343 local groups.148 Most distinctively, the 
national board of directors is elected by the membership at large, 
and each chapter is governed by an executive committee that in-
cludes representatives from each local group. Local groups, in 
turn, have their own elected executive committees. In all, there are 
12,500 leadership posts, including 10,000 at the local level.149 Even 
with proportionately low levels of face-to-face participation, the or-
ganization is able to cultivate civic leadership skills and to motivate 
a respectable number of members to participate in internal elec-
                                                   
 144. Founded in 1991, the Kensington Welfare Rights Union is a social justice group of, 
by, and for the poor and homeless in Philadelphia. Kensington Welfare Rights Union, ENV’T
RES. FOUND., http://www.rachel.org/?q=en/node/128 (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). The Na-
tional Lawyers Guild, a democratically structured, member-driven, federated organization 
was founded in 1937. The League of Women Voters was founded in the wake of the 19th 
Amendment. It was originally a collection of suffrage groups. Currently, it has 50,000 mem-
bers and leagues in all 50 states. Still, it has struggled to maintain active membership and 
recruit new members. See La Piana Consulting, Assessment and Transformation Map: League of 
Women Voters (2018), http://www.lwvgt.org/files/LWV_Transformation_Roadmap_1.8.17_
rev.pdf. 
 145. GRACE BUDRYS, HOW NONPROFITS WORK: CASE STUDIES IN NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS 76–78 (2012) (profiling the social welfare work of the Chicago Y, including 
the provision of 1,500 single occupancy rooms, while noting that nationally, as of 2008, the 
YMCA had 20.9 million dues-paying members in 2,687 local chapters). 
 146. Cf. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 91, at 194 (noting that “organizations with 
many members may be heeded just as rapidly as organizations able to make large campaign 
contributions” insofar as membership at scale both confers legitimacy and poses an electoral 
threat). 
 147. Andrews et al., supra note 143, at 1203. The Sierra Club was founded in 1892, but its 
membership grew, in three main waves, after World War II. 
 148. Id. at 1204. 
 149. Id. at 1195, 1218–19. 
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tions.150 Meanwhile, dues are distributed back to chapters based on 
their membership levels, and local groups have control over their 
programing.151
Unions are the only genuine exception to this trend. For one, 
despite significant declines in membership, they continue to be 
remarkably effective at boosting voter turnout, especially among 
low- and middle-income Americans.152 Indeed, “[a]mong high 
school drop outs in the private sector, union members’ probability 
of voting is 11 percentage points higher than for otherwise similar 
non-members.”153 States with higher concentrations of union 
membership also tend to have higher voter turnout rates.154 Addi-
tionally, union members tend to join more civic associations and to 
encourage nonunion family members to vote.155
Unfortunately, the steep decline in unionism in the private sec-
tor undercuts unions’ ability to serve as a bulwark for non-college 
educated Americans’ political and economic interests. Changes in 
the American economy as well as legal policies have led to the con-
centration of union membership in the public sector.156 This signif-
icantly undermines the equalizing political effect of unionism be-
cause public-sector workers are generally better educated and less 
in political need of the union-effect.157
Until there is a revival in private-sector unionism or its equiva-
lent,158 the ability of contemporary unions to provide a political 
                                                   
 150. Id. at 1204, 1218 (estimating that only about 20% of members partake in face-to-
face opportunities and finding, inter alia, that member engagement is closely associated with 
the number of core activists as well as their choice of programming). 
 151. Id. at 1204–05. 
 152. Sean McElwee, How Unions Boost Democratic Participation, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 16, 
2015), https://prospect.org/article/how-unions-boost-democratic-participation (noting that 
52% of union workers voted in the 2014 midterm, compared to 39% of non-union workers); 
ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 163, 173 (noting that, other than churches, unions are the on-
ly organizations capable of drawing out non-elite voters on a large scale and further that un-
ion vote effects are largest for the least educated). 
 153. ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 173 (noting that “[f]urther up the educational spec-
trum, the gap in turnout differentials shrinks” but that “the union vote premium among 
private-sector college graduates is nearly twice the public-sector premium”). 
 154. Benjamin Radcliff & Patricia Davis, Labor Organizations and Electoral Participation in 
Industrial Democracies, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 132, 135, 137 (2000) (finding an approximately 
6.5% increase in turnout as levels of unionization become significant and reporting that this 
is approximately the same effect due to a higher educated electorate).  
 155. McElwee, supra note 152 (reporting that “individuals living in a union household 
are 2.5 points more liked to vote and register” after controlling for other factors). 
 156. Cf. ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 64–67, 164–70 & fig. 7.1 (showing that in 1973, less 
than twenty percent of union members worked in the public sector whereas, by 2009, they 
comprised the majority); see also id. at 43–45, 67–68 (arguing that there are structural limits 
to how much growth is possible in public-sector jobs and how these limits also explain why 
the union-wage premium for public-sector members is 18%, significantly lower than in the 
private sector). 
 157. Id.
 158. See, e.g., Rest. Law Ctr. v. N. Y. C., 360 F. Supp. 3d 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Chamber of 
Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018). But see Memorandum from Jayme 
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counterweight to the interests of economic elites is significantly 
limited. Public-sector unionism—even if it manages to survive the 
current Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment 
and the concerted attacks it is facing from conservatives—cannot 
serve these same equalizing functions because most public-sector 
union workers are significantly more privileged than the union 
members of the past.159 The political effects of public-sector unions 
largely accrue to college-educated Americans—teachers, firefight-
ers, and police. These middle and upper-middle class, college-
educated workers also need organizational help in our current po-
litical environment, but their successes are unlikely to address the 
needs of non-college educated workers.160
3. The Political Consequences of the  
New Configuration of Civil Society 
Like unions, mid-twentieth-century civic associations drew politi-
cal strength from their social networks and governance structures. 
Face-to-face participation created strong social ties, capable of 
generating time-consuming and substantial political action, while 
associational breadth derived from their socioeconomically inte-
grated membership enhanced their capacity for effective political 
mobilization. Meanwhile, their governance structures solved a host 
of problems that modern grassroots community organizations face 
relating to scale and sustainability.161
                                                   
L. Sophir, Associate General Counsel Division of Advice, to Jill Coffman, Regional Director 
Region 20 (Apr. 17, 2019); see also Lee, supra note 25.  
 159. Largely in recognition of the effectiveness of unions in politics, conservatives have 
been on a mission to undermine the ability of workers, particularly public-sector workers, to 
unionize. Funded by the Koch network and facilitated by the American Legislative Ex-
change Council, a host of state legislatures, including in states where public support for pub-
lic-sector unions was high, have significantly curtailed their power. See generally Theda 
Skocpol & Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, The Koch Network and Republican Party Extremism, 14 
PERSP. ON POL. 681, 693–94 (2016); Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Basic Facts: New Conserva-
tive Strategies to Weaken America’s Public Sector Unions, SSN (Oct. 18, 2015), 
https://scholars.org/brief/new-conservative-strategies-weaken-americas-public-sector-
unions. Not satisfied with these legislative wins, however, conservative interests constitution-
alized their gains. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2484–86 (2018). 
 160. ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 7 (arguing that given their membership unions are no 
longer capable of “providing [non-college educated workers] with resources and training to 
engage in politics and translating their political activity into support for policies that bene-
fited average workers”). 
 161. Cf. HOLLIE RUSSON GILMAN & K. SABEEL RAHMAN, BUILDING CIVIC CAPACITY IN AN 
ERA OF DEMOCRATIC CRISIS 3 (2017), https://na-production.s3.amazonaws.com/
documents/Building_Civic_Capacity_in_an_Era_of_Democratic_Crisis.pdf (noting that any 
effort to increase civic capacity at the grassroots will need to address problems of scale and 
sustainability).
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The political power of this organizational form is evident in the 
role played by such groups in the passage of the most generous re-
distributive federal programs in American policymaking, from So-
cial Security and Medicare, to the Civil Rights Act and the Voting 
Rights Act.162 The G.I. Bill—the single greatest economic equalizer 
for white men and a critical catalyst for the leadership in the Civil 
Rights movement—was the brainchild of the American Legion, 
which was involved in its drafting after World War II.163 Many such 
groups were also vital to growing and sustaining key social move-
ments of the period.164 At the same time, unions worked to counter 
the efforts of business on a variety of fronts, including the mini-
mum wage.165
The political consequences of the demise of this civic configura-
tion have been profound. Newly professionalized and dependent 
on foundations for funding, national organizations have eschewed 
political mobilization in favor of litigation and lobbying.166 Moreo-
ver, these policy shops frequently “gravitate toward upper-middle-
class constituencies”167 and their policy priorities, to the neglect of 
policies that would benefit disadvantaged constituents.168
With these changes, everyday Americans have lost political pow-
er. In the absence of effective organization, their votes have be-
come a weak counterweight to the political power money buys.169 A 
significant factor in this regard has been the demise of meaningful 
membership. As previously discussed, recruitment is central to 
both individual mobilization and collective success. Moreover, as it 
                                                   
 162. See Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 183–85 (reviewing the literature). 
 163. METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS, supra note 121, at 18–22 (describing how the 
American Legion utilized its grassroots network to generate widespread support for its gen-
erous bill and to overcome modest ambitions of Roosevelt administration’s proposal).  
 164. Andrews et al., supra note 143, at 1192 (observing that a third of the 47 federated 
civic groups with membership of 1% or more of the U.S. population at any point between 
1776 and 1940 were critical to major social movements of the period) (citing Theda Skocpol 
et al., A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Volunteerism in the United States, 94 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 527, 529 (2000)). 
 165. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 23, at 140; Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 115; see also
Sachs, supra note 22, at 169–71 (reviewing literature on historic political power of unions). 
 166. SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 224 (noting decision to eschew civic education and po-
litical mobilization). 
 167. Id. at 224. 
 168. Dara Z. Strolovitch, Do Interest Groups Represent the Disadvantaged? Advocacy at the In-
tersections of Race, Class, and Gender, 68 J. AM. POl. 894, 904–05 (2006) (finding, in particular, 
that organizations consistently underestimate the benefits of policies that most affect disad-
vantaged subgroups). 
 169. Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 120 (noting that organizations that “have no mass 
membership . . . to mobilize . . . do little to draw broader coalitions of middle- and lower-
income citizens into electoral and legislative processes”); accord Sachs, supra note 22, at 167 
(noting that “organization, like wealth, is itself a source of political power”). 
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happens, Americans are most likely to be recruited into politics 
through connections formed in civic associations.170
Thus, in the absence of fraternity, contemporary civic groups, 
including those that remain federated, are at a significant disad-
vantage when they do seek to generate the kind of political activity 
that is necessary to hold elected officials accountable. Doug 
McAdam’s seminal study of the Freedom Rides was probably the 
first to draw attention to this point: by comparing accepted appli-
cants to the Freedom Rides, he found that prior personal connec-
tions, not ideological commitments, distinguished those who ulti-
mately participated from those who applied but failed to turn up.171
More recently, in The Making of Pro-Life Activists, Ziad W. Munson 
shows how the path to pro-life activism (including the picketing of 
clinics) cannot be explained by either demographics or ideological 
beliefs, but is instead the product of “organizational and relational 
ties.”172 Indeed, almost a quarter of the activists he interviewed con-
                                                   
 170. VERBA ET AL., supra note 117, at 144, 157 (concluding, more broadly, that nonpolit-
ical institutions are significant generators of civic and political engagement, inter alia, “be-
cause those who are affiliated with these institutions develop the personal networks from 
which requests for activity often spring”); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 48 (reporting 
that those who participate in membership organizations, regardless of whether they are af-
firmatively political, are more likely to take part in politics); see also Chaeyoon Lim, Social 
Networks and Political Participation: How Do Networks Matter, 87 SOCIAL FORCES 961, 967–68, 
970–71, 973 (2008) (finding that in second-wave Citizen Participation Study “[a]ssociational
ties [were] the most common channels of recruitment” for the three types of political activi-
ties studied and that a direct, personal connection to a recruiter significantly explained de-
cisions to contact government officials or participate in community politics, in particular, 
doubling the likelihood of successful recruitment); Dietlind Stolle & Thomas R. Rochon, Are
All Associations Alike? Member Diversity, Associational Type, and the Creation of Social Capital, in
BEYOND TOCQUEVILLE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SOCIAL CAPITAL DEBATE IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 143, 144, 151 (reporting findings that membership in leisure groups resulted in 
political participation 60% of the time but raising questions about whether groups orga-
nized around exclusion would do the same). 
 171. See, e.g., Doug McAdam, Recruitment to High Risk Activism: The Case of the Freedom 
Summer, 92 AM. J. SOC. 64 (1986) (finding that notwithstanding similar levels of time and 
motivation, participants in the 1964 Freedom Summer had deeper personal and organiza-
tional connections to the Civil Rights movement); see also Doug McAdam & Ronnelle 
Paulsen, Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism, 99 AM. J. SOC. 640, 656–60 
(1993) (reanalyzing the data and concluding that political commitments had to be rein-
forced by social ties formed in organizations before it yielded high-risk activism, and further, 
that continued contact with activist friends from the Civil Rights movement sustained activ-
ism and political engagement over the long term). 
 172. ZIAD W. MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
MOBILIZATION WORKS 20, 44 (2008). Munson’s findings are based on, inter alia, observations 
of and in-depth interviews with anti-abortion “activists and nonactivists” as his goal was to 
explain why many individuals with pro-life commitments “nonetheless remain uninvolved in 
any sustained way.” Id. Summarizing his research for a popular audience, Munson explains: 
“pro-life activism begins not because of any epiphany . . . about the evils of abortion—but 
because [individuals] bump[] into someone already in the pro-life movement . . . a friend, 
neighbor, or work colleague in the course of an ordinary day” and accept their invitation to 
go to an anti-abortion activity. Ziad W. Munson, Key Findings Brief: How People Become Pro-
Life Activists, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Feb. 8, 2016), https://scholars.org/brief/how-
people-become-pro-life-activists; see also Valerie A Lewis et al., Religion, Networks, and Neighbor-
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sidered themselves to be pro-choice at the time of their initial foray 
into the movement, while many more were ambivalent or unclear 
about their pro-life commitments.173
Tellingly, the heavyweights among contemporary civic associa-
tions have largely held onto critical features that made mid-
twentieth century associations so politically powerful: meaningful 
membership, opportunities for face-to-face association, federated 
structures, democratic governance, and socioeconomic integra-
tion. Most also include a significant recreational or nonpolitical 
draw. They are, however, the exceptions rather than the norm. 
The AARP’s political muscle derives from its nearly 38 million 
members, who contribute over $295 million in membership dues 
each year and who vote regularly and at higher rates than other 
age groups on Election Day.174 Equally importantly, its membership 
includes many non-elite seniors, enabling it to operate as “a mass 
membership organization . . . through which the influence of less 
well-off Americans flows.”175 While the vast majority of its members 
simply write a $16 check to the organization to receive a variety of 
discounts as well as its magazine, which covers both lifestyle and 
political news, between 500,000 and 1.9 million members are active 
in its 1,300 local chapters.176 These chapters advertise themselves as 
opportunities for newly relocated or widowed members to make 
new friends, while also pursuing civic-minded projects with others. 
In recent years, the organization has sought to increase its state 
and local presence in innovative ways. To that end, the AARP par-
ticipated in rebuilding communities in New Orleans, including by 
training local activists and by organizing all-ages walking groups.177
Although the AARP is a stalwart advocate for the interests of sen-
                                                   
liness: The Impact of Religious Social Networks on Civic Engagement, 42 SOC. SCI. RES. 331, 339–40 
(2013) (finding that “those who attend religious services more often are more likely to en-
gage in civic activities and informal helping not because of belief, politics, or general socia-
bility, but because they have strong religious social networks”). 
 173. MUNSON, supra note 172, at 6 (“My data show that many individuals who become 
activists are at best ambivalent, and in many cases decidedly pro-choice, in their views on 
abortion before getting involved. Their views change during the actual process of becoming 
activists.”); see also id. at 33–35, 43 (describing these individuals’ representations about their 
prior beliefs and observing that “[a]lmost half of all activists in my sample did not hold pro-
life beliefs prior to their involvement in the pro-life movement”). 
 174. See Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 189. See generally MARK NOVAK, ISSUES IN AGING 
(4th ed. 2018).
 175. Martin Gilens, Policy Consequences of Representational Inequality, in WHO GETS 
REPRESENTED? 247, 248, 272–74 (Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011). 
 176. CHRISTINE L. DAY, AARP: AMERICA’S LARGEST INTEREST GROUP AND ITS IMPACT 41 
(2017) (describing levels of active participation).
 177. AARP, Consolidated Financial Statements Together with Report of Independent 
Certified Public Accountants (2016), https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/about_
aarp/annual_reports/2017/form-990-2016-aarp.pdf (representing just under 20 percent of 
its annual operating revenue). 
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iors, its internal governance structures do not offer individual 
members much voice. Indeed, in 2001, the AARP, which in many 
respects operates as a large business, revised its bylaws to end elec-
tions for its Board.178 Still, the AARP is an effective organization 
when it comes to both mobilizing seniors and, arguably more im-
portantly, identifying legislative opportunities that benefit them.179
Equally importantly, it is not the only organization working effec-
tively on behalf of seniors.180
Originally founded in 1871, the NRA did not grow its sizeable 
membership until the 1950s, despite significant and ongoing fed-
eral subsidies.181 Today, the NRA is well-known for having effective-
ly integrated a lobbying-focused D.C. headquarters (heavily funded 
by gun manufacturers) with a network of local gun clubs present in 
every state. By some estimates, its membership tops 3 million.182
NRA membership comes with opportunities to socialize, comple-
mentary lifestyle and political magazines, effective voter guides, 
and political education.183 Perhaps most conspicuously, NRA mem-
bers have been found to be demonstrably more politically active 
than gun owners who do not belong to the NRA.184 Like the AARP, 
                                                   
 178. DAY, supra note 176, at 36, 41. 
 179. CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 77–78 (noting, in particular, that “AARP members are 
more likely than nonmembers to contact elected officials and to contact them about Social 
Security specifically” and why this pattern is most likely the result of mobilization). 
 180. Id. at 76 (identifying the National Council of Senior Citizens as another key politi-
cal advocacy). 
 181. ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 69–73 (2d ed. 1998) (recount-
ing decades of direct and substantial federal financial support to the NRA, as well as the or-
ganization’s early efforts to affiliate with 2000 local sporting clubs, which grew its member-
ship from 3,500 to 50,000, while noting that it was not until after the war that its 
membership exploded).  
 182. The NRA is notoriously unwilling to share reliable information about its member-
ship, and although it reports having around 5.5 million dues paying members, it has been 
accused of exaggerating its numbers. See, e.g., Alex Yablon, New NRA Tax Filing Shows Member-
ship Revenues Dropped by $47 Million Following Sandy Hook Surge, TRACE (Jan. 23, 2016), 
https://www.thetrace.org/2016/01/nra-membership-drop/ (explaining controversy about 
exact membership roll but also noting organization receives about $175 million in member-
ship dues annually); accord Christopher Ingraham, NRA Membership Is Up Since Parkland Kill-
ings, Group’s Magazine Subscriptions Suggest, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Sept. 19, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/09/19/magazine-numbers-suggest-nra-
has-added-hundreds-thousands-new-members/. 
 183. See Grades and Endorsements, NRA-PVF: POL. VICTORY FUND, https://www.nrapvf.org/
grades/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (announcing endorsements and candidate ratings in 
hundreds of federal and state races); NRA-ILA: INST. LEGIS. ACTION,
https://www.nraila.org/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (providing up-to-date alerts on elected 
officials’ positions on gun-related issues and providing news regarding state and federal leg-
islative activity); SPITZER, supra note 181, at 75 (noting NRA’s extraordinary expenditures as 
compared to other groups “on internal communication designed not only to buttress sup-
port for the NRA but to rally support for political candidates sympathetic to the NRA per-
spective”).
 184. According to a 2017 Pew study, approximately 46% of gun owners in the NRA re-
port having contacted a public official to express their opinion on gun policy; 24% said they 
had done so in the past 12 months. By contrast, only 15% of gun owners who do not belong 
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the NRA’s political strengths are a product of the size of its mem-
bership, its organizational structure, and the connections it has de-
veloped to elected officials.185 It does not, however, promote inter-
nal democratic governance, and it accepts significant donations 
from wealthy individuals.186
* * *
In sum, the weakness of contemporary civil society as an engine 
for the broad interests of the electorate goes well beyond the ab-
sence of representation. It also lies in the form of that representa-
tion. The organizations that do exist to represent Main Street have 
grown weaker on the exact same axes that best support effective 
political participation: socioeconomic integration, interpersonal 
depth, and participatory federated governance structures. 
Taken together, the three trends discussed in this section pro-
mote a vicious political cycle of disorganization, demobilization, 
and disengagement. The collapse of private-sector unions has fur-
ther fed both the economic and political inequality of the New 
Gilded Age.187 When combined with the atrophying of active mem-
bership in all forms, it has led to significant democratic disen-
gagement—affecting both the sorts of policies that are adopted 
and, perhaps more importantly, who has a place at the table when 
those policies are conceived and prioritized. The result, as Skocpol 
explains, is a political configuration in which everyday citizens 
struggle to be heard: 
If contemporary America’s top-heavy civic world encour-
ages doing-for rather than doing-with, it limits popular mo-
bilization and promotes trivial polarizations in politics, and 
                                                   
to the NRA report they have ever reached out to a public figure regarding gun policy, and 
just 5% report having done so in the past 12 months. Kim Parker, Among Gun Owners, NRA 
Members Have a Unique Set of Views and Experiences, PEW RES. CTR. (July 5, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/07/05/among-gun-owners-nra-members-have-
a-unique-set-of-views-and-experiences/. 
 185. SPITZER, supra note 181, at 77–83 (naming the six Presidents and several congres-
sional leaders who were members). 
 186. See Jay Willis, Could the NRA Be Taken Over from the Inside?, GQ (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://www.gq.com/story/nra-takeover-bylaws-leadership (explaining how the organiza-
tion has carefully used its “bylaws to restrict the franchise to a small, insular, and carefully-
curated group of this country’s gun owners” in order to undermine the voice of its mem-
bers, nearly three-quarters of whom, for example, support background checks).  
 187. ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 183 (noting that demise of private-sector unions has 
“reconfigured the electorate by reducing the political voice of those lacking a college educa-
tion”). 
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it also skews national politics and public policy making to-
ward the values and interests of the privileged.188
Similarly, Robert D. Putnam observes that as more “people skip the 
meeting[s]” where local policy decisions are made, these policies 
grow less and less reflective of median interests.189
The political consequences have been particularly acute for the 
many working- and middle-class Americans who have concrete 
needs—from workers without a college degree, to working parents, 
to communities that depend on Medicaid and CHIP or bear the 
burdens of mass incarceration.190 In the absence of effective organ-
ization, these individuals and communities are unable to penetrate 
the “upper-class accent” of the heavenly chorus of Washington in-
terest groups.191
II. LAW AND THE SHAPING OF CIVIC AND POLITICAL CAPACITY
And still, the political tides appear to be changing. Writing in 
the early 2000s, Putnam lamented that a growing deficit in social 
capital had resulted in significant declines in all forms of political 
participation—from voter turnout, to attendance at political rallies 
and public meetings, to running for office.192 Schlozman, Verba, 
and Brady similarly bemoaned “an uninterrupted downward trend 
in overall activity” during the period from 1972 to 2002, including 
“attending a public meeting on town or school affairs,” “signing a 
petition,” “working for a political party,” and “holding or running 
for a political office.”193 This has recently shifted. 
Political engagement has been on the rise for the last decade. 
For a start, voter turnout has been steadily rising since 2008. In-
deed, turnout during presidential elections is rapidly approaching 
that of the mid-twentieth century.194 The trajectory of voter partici-
                                                   
 188. SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 236. 
 189. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 31, at 342 (“When most people skip the meet-
ing[s]” where local policy decisions are made, “those who are left tend to be more extreme, 
because they care most about the outcome.”). 
 190. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 344, 346 (noting the absence of groups for 
“parents of children in Head Start programs, women at home, office receptionists, Wal-Mart 
associates, criminal defendants awaiting trial, recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families benefits or food stamps, [and] parking lot attendants”). 
 191. Id. at 346. 
 192. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 31, at 35 (arguing that “[d]eclining electoral 
participation is merely the most visible symptom of a broader disengagement from commu-
nity life”). 
 193. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 162–63. 
 194. Presidential election turnout peaked in 1960 at nearly 64%. The 2008 presidential 
election brought out almost 62% of the electorate. National General Election VEP Turnout 
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pations in midterm elections is harder to gauge: the 2014 midterm 
election saw the lowest levels of turnout since 1942 with an esti-
mated 36.6% of eligible voters showing up to vote.195 Turnout in 
the 2018 midterm, however, was the highest in nearly a century.196
This fresh political energy extends beyond voting. The election 
of Donald Trump triggered an unexpected and unprecedented 
level of political engagement and organization.197 A staggering and 
unexpected 3.2 million Americans joined in the Women’s March 
to resist President Trump’s messages of xenophobia, sexism, rac-
ism, scientific skepticism, and official corruption on the day of his 
inauguration—at least half a million in Washington, D.C. itself.198
The Women’s March turned out to be just the beginning. Accord-
ing to a 2018 Washington Post-Kaiser Family Foundation poll, one 
in five Americans report participating in a street protest or political 
rally since 2016.199
Nor has recent political engagement been limited to demonstra-
tions or confined to resisting President Trump’s political agenda. 
Remarkably, over 6,000 grassroots political groups have been 
formed to oppose President Trump’s policies, many organized by 
middle-class women.200 We have also seen a wave of teachers’ strikes 
and protests in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, Colorado, 
North Carolina, and Kentucky.201 This engagement followed on a 
                                                   
Rates, 1789–Present, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://www.electproject.org/national-1789-
present (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).  
 195. Editorial Board, Opinion, The Worst Voter Turnout in 72 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/opinion/the-worst-voter-turnout-in-72-
years.html.
 196. Mira Rojanasakul et al., Americans Actually Voted in the 2018 Midterms, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-midterm-election-turnout-
shifts/. 
 197. See Mark Blumenthal & Erin Pinkus, Poll Finds Surge of Political Activism on the Left,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/poll-finds-
surge-of-political-activism-on-the-left_us_58daad61e4b0ae61844c0706 (reporting on polls 
seeking to quantify the flurry of political activities in the early months of the Trump admin-
istration). 
 198. Erica Chenoweth & Jeremy Pressman, This Is What We Learned by Counting the Wom-
en’s Marches, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/02/07/this-is-what-we-learned-by-counting-the-womens-
marches/?utm_term=.3e94884961ca (noting marches took place in 653 locations). 
 199. Jordan & Clement, supra note 72.  
 200. See Peter Dreier, The Anti-Trump Movement: Recover, Resist, Reform—The Profusion of 
Citizen Organizing as a Defense—and Offense, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 4, 2017), 
https://prospect.org/article/anti-trump-movement-recover-resist-reform-0.; David Pozen, 
The Tax-Code Shift That’s Changing Liberal Activism, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/501c3-501c4-activists-and-tax-
code/576364/. 
 201. E.g., Rivka Galchen, The Teacher’s Strike and the Democratic Revival in Oklahoma, NEW
YORKER (May 28, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/04/the-teachers-
strike-and-the-democratic-revival-in-oklahoma; see also Valerie Strauss, A New Public Education 
Movement Is Emerging in Wisconsin, a Rebuke to Gov. Walker’s War on Labor and School Privatiza-
tion, WASH. POST (July 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
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decade of grassroots mobilization around an array of issues rang-
ing from income inequality, to police shootings as symbols of en-
demic racial bias, to the development and transportation of natu-
ral gas.202
Finally, several policies that would address the concerns of many 
working- and middle-class families have been placed back on the 
policy agenda. These include raising the minimum wage, govern-
ment-guaranteed medical coverage, universal pre-K, and free col-
lege tuition. 
The central question, then, is how to harness this newfound po-
litical energy to rebuild a civil society capable of providing an ef-
fective counterweight to the political power derived from econom-
ic capital. There is obviously no going back. Economic, social, and 
cultural transformations, along with advances in technology, pre-
clude the possibility (and desirability) of returning to the past. The 
appeal of sex- and race-segregated membership-based civic associa-
tions has significantly waned (thankfully), and the route to politi-
cal power no longer runs through ethnic, religious, and veterans’ 
groups.203 Still, the fact that there is no way back does not mean 
that there is no way forward. 
The critical first step in seeing the possibilities for positive 
change is to begin to understand the complex interface between 
law and civil society. The robust associational life of the mid-
twentieth century was not happenstance: it was the product of New 
Deal policymaking. Indeed, the political energy of seniors today, 
including those of average socioeconomic status, like the political 
power of the AARP, is not simply fortuitous.204 It is a direct result of 
the fact that Social Security and Medicare—programs that are visi-
ble, generous, universal for those eligible, and well-managed—
have not been scaled back, unlike many other New Deal pro-
grams.205 By the same token, the present participatory and organi-
zational inequalities that impede the ability of low- and middle-
income Americans to resist the political sway of elites and super-
elites are a byproduct of the form that both regulation and deregu-
lation have taken since the 1980s. In political science jargon, this 
phenomenon is known as a policy feedback. 
                                                   
sheet/wp/2018/07/03/a-new-public-education-movement-is-emerging-in-wisconsin-a-
rebuke-to-gov-walkers-war-on-labor-and-school-privatization/?utm_term=.cb827bd1f883. 
 202. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Defining Nonviolence as a Matter of Law and Politics, in LXII
NOMOS: PROTEST AND DISSENT (Melissa Schwartzberg, ed. 2019) (forthcoming) (manuscript 
on file with author). 
 203. SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 113. 
 204. See CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 14–15, 32–37, 65–79. 
 205. See Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 112–15 (noting the ways in which the repeal of 
social programs benefitting citizens of average to below average means “have worked to re-
verse their civic and political incorporation”). 
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The basic insight (empirically verified in study after study) is 
that policymaking has second-order effects on citizens’ attitudes 
about and relations to democracy—effects that can either instill 
civic and political engagement or breed endemic apathy.206 The 
specific direction of the policy feedback depends not only on the 
quality (e.g., generous vs. stingy, universal vs. means-tested, equita-
ble vs. preferential) but also on the form (visible vs. invisible, ra-
tional vs. arbitrary, well-managed vs. dysfunctional) of the policies 
implemented.207
The recognition of policy feedbacks, which has dominated cer-
tain sectors of political science, has important underappreciated 
implications for good governance reformers. Foremost, it suggests 
that public policy choices, as instantiated in legislation, will inevi-
tably play a role in either reversing or reinforcing the current tra-
jectory of civil society and, hence, democracy. 
A. Virtuous Democratic Policy Feedbacks 
The virtuous democratic circle from civic and political participa-
tion to policy responsiveness to the white middle-class in the mid-
twentieth century was itself a byproduct of the form of New Deal 
governance.208 At the time—frequently at the behest of the very civ-
ic associations that fostered political engagement and participa-
tion—Washington chose to provide ample benefits to large swaths 
of American society. The Social Security Act, like the G.I. Bill, 
doled out generous benefits to many ordinary Americans in highly 
visible ways with significant democratic returns.209
Over the years, many have praised the generation that entered 
adulthood during World War II for their extraordinary civic and 
political engagement. Veterans of World War II liberally joined or-
ganizations and clubs over the course of their lives and have been 
extoled for their high levels of civic participation.210 And yet, this 
                                                   
 206. See infra notes 212–228 & 245–260 and accompanying text. 
 207. See Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 183–97 (reviewing studies of the policy feedbacks 
of a range of New Deal programs and identifying the War on Poverty as the least effective in 
empowering its beneficiaries over the long term). 
 208. See id. at 196–97. 
 209. See CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 65–66, 92 (explicating the policy feedback cycle of 
the expansion of Social Security for seniors); Suzanne Mettler, Bringing the State Back in to 
Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans, 96 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 351, 359, 361 (2002) [hereinafter Mettler, Bringing the State Back] (summarizing how 
the G.I. Bill affected participants and why elevated levels of civic and political engagement 
among its beneficiaries cannot be attributed simply to their raised educational or socioeco-
nomic status). 
 210. METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS, supra note 121, at 107, 122 (finding veterans who 
had used the G.I. Bill reported 50% more memberships in civic and political organizations 
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enhanced democratic engagement cannot be attributed simply to 
military service, as veterans of subsequent wars “have not been 
more active in civic affairs than [similarly situated] nonveterans.”211
What then explains the unique civic engagement of World War 
II veterans? The answer to this puzzle lies in the G.I. Bill itself. Su-
zanne Mettler, in her seminal work on the Servicemen’s Readjust-
ment Act of 1943 (aka the G.I. Bill), finds that its education and 
training provisions had an overwhelmingly positive effect on male 
veterans’ civic involvement. The effect proved significant even after 
controlling for all sorts of individual attributes, most importantly, 
parental civic and political engagement and advanced education.212
The effect, moreover, was not reducible to the increased education 
or the enhanced socioeconomic status of beneficiaries resulting 
from their education.213 And the effect was most pronounced for 
beneficiaries from lower socioeconomic backgrounds214 and for 
those who took advantage of access to sub-college programs.215
In sum, critical to the program’s success were three factors that 
communicated civic respect: generosity of benefits, virtually uni-
versal access for men, and smooth administration.216 Mettler con-
cludes: 
                                                   
and that despite the fact that most of these groups’ “primary purpose was not first and 
foremost political,” involvement “did help to politicize citizens and draw them closer to the 
political process”); Mettler, Bringing the State Back, supra note 209, at 357–59, 361 (reporting 
that “use of the G.I. Bill for education,” independent of attained educational level, “proved 
to be a significant positive determinant of . . . participation in a wide range of political or-
ganizational memberships and activities,” while emphasizing its “pronounced impact on civ-
ic engagement among veterans from less advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds”). 
 211. METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS, supra note 121, at 5 (reviewing relevant studies 
comparing civic engagement of veterans to nonveterans). 
 212. Id. at 107 (finding that “veterans who used the G.I. Bill’s education and training 
provisions became especially active citizens in the postwar era,” where political activity was 
defined broadly to include membership in political organizations from clubs to party com-
mittees, as well as contacting officials, campaigns, running for local office, contributing 
money, and protesting). 
 213. Id. at 108 (finding that “the G.I. Bill’s effect on civic involvement was not reducible 
simply to the formal education or improved socioeconomic status that it promoted” given 
that “even among veterans who had the same level of education, those who had used the 
G.I. Bill became members of more such organizations).  
 214. Id. at 112 (noting that G.I. Bill usage significantly boosted “the rate of joining civic 
organizations among those from low-medium and medium standards of living in child-
hood”). 
 215. Id. at 114 (noting that “use of the G.I. Bill for subcollege programs functioned as an 
especially powerful and significant determinant of both veterans’ civic memberships and 
their political involvement in the postwar era, even more so than use of the higher educa-
tion benefits”). 
 216. Id. at 10, 59, 106. On universality, it is important to note that after World War II, 
80% of men were military veterans and those veterans were broadly representative of the 
U.S. population because of the draft. Id. at 7. As such, 51% of young men took advantage of 
the program. Id.; see also id. at 6–7 (describing the generosity of the program, which includ-
ed, among other things, stipends adjusted for marital status). 
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Through the program’s inclusive design, its fair manner of 
implementation, and its transformative socioeconomic ef-
fects, it communicated to beneficiaries that government was for 
and about people like them, and thus it incorporated them 
more fully as citizens. Beneficiaries responded by embrac-
ing the duties and obligations of active citizenship. Such ef-
fects were most pronounced . . . among particular groups 
whose inclusion signified the expansion of social oppor-
tunity.217
For African-American recipients, in particular, the G.I. Bill was 
their first positive experience with American government and 
stood in stark contrast to the rest of their experiences, including 
military service.218 Many, in turn, became early leaders within the 
civil rights movement.219
The G.I. Bill was not alone. In all, the visible and generous gov-
ernment programs of the mid-twentieth century communicated a 
sense that beneficiaries mattered as citizens while stimulating in-
terest in government.220 In doing so, they promoted a positive poli-
cy feedback—one that fostered political participation and civic en-
gagement,221 while “elevat[ing] the collective political capacities of 
low- and middle-income Americans” in particular.222 Even the 
means-tested Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, 
through its generosity, proved capable of building political capaci-
ty among its beneficiaries.223
Equally importantly, the New Deal programs created incentives 
to organize. These incentives existed both from the bottom up and 
the top down.224 The very existence of beneficiaries creates an in-
centive to form groups. It has long been recognized, for instance, 
that Social Security, like agricultural subsidies, incentivized the 
                                                   
 217. Id. at 106 (emphasis added). 
 218. Id. at 11, 119. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 111–12 (emphasizing the importance of the ways 
New Deal programs “presented citizens with visible evidence of their collective stake in gov-
ernment outputs and political processes”). 
 221. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 46–55 (concluding that “Social Security both 
raises and democratizes senior participation; compared with that of the rest of the popula-
tion senior citizens’ political participation is less unequal because of low-income seniors’ 
greater activity with regard to Social Security”). Similarly, farmers, as the beneficiaries of 
New Deal agricultural subsidies, have an unusually high turnout rate in elections. Mettler, 
Bringing the State Back, supra note 209, at 352. 
 222. Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 111–12; see also Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 157–
58.
 223. Hacker et al., supra note 40, at 182. 
 224. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 70–79 (providing an overview of the history of 
mobilization by political parties and interest groups in the wake of the passage and expan-
sion of Social Security). 
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formation of the AARP, the American Farm Bureau Federation, 
and the National Farmers Union.225 The public participation built 
into various environmental statutes passed in the 1970s offers the 
most recent illustration of the creation of bottom up incentives.226
As for top down incentives, there is little question that existing po-
litical elites frequently find it in their interest to organize and mo-
bilize beneficiaries of federal programs in their efforts to win of-
fice.227 Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the federated 
structure of civic associations in the nineteenth century was a 
product of the changed expanse of federal policymaking, particu-
larly for veterans in the wake of the Civil War.228
B. Vicious Democratic Policy Feedbacks 
By the same token, the vicious democratic circle in which disor-
ganization breeds unequal political participation and even less pol-
icy responsiveness can be attributed to the policy feedbacks of 
lawmaking since the 1980s. Despite the rhetorical antipathy to gov-
ernment “handouts,” lawmaking in the post-Reagan era has not 
taken government out of the business of doling out largesse. It is 
just that the largesse is now undertaken through tax policy, rather 
than direct support, and is directed toward corporations, wealthy 
individuals, and home-owning professionals employed by large 
companies. 
The new preference for distributing monetary benefits through 
tax incentives has been dubbed the “submerged” or “hidden” wel-
fare state.229 Hidden in the complexity of the tax code, this form of 
                                                   
 225. Id. at 75–79 (explaining how “senior interest groups are both effects and causes in 
the participatory cycle” and emphasizing that “[s]enior mass membership groups did not 
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ly Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 111–12 (summarizing evidence that “[t]he . . . welfare 
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 226. See Kenneth T. Andrews & Bob Edwards, The Organizational Structure of Local Envi-
ronmentalism, 10 MOBILIZATION 213, 215 (2005) (noting that “[e]nvironmental advocacy has 
developed alongside the growth and transformation of state institutions”). 
 227. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 74 (concluding analysis of evidence of political 
parties’ increased attention to seniors over the course of twentieth century by observing that 
“[w]ithout Social Security, there is no constituency to appeal to, just an age group . . . divid-
ed by other cleavages and interests”). 
 228. See Jocelyn Elise Crowley & Theda Skocpol, The Rush to Organize: Explaining Associa-
tional Formation in the United States, 1860s-1920s, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 813, 815 (2001); Theda 
Skocpol et al., A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United 
States, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 527, 532–34 (2000).  
 229. Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges of Social Policy Re-
form in the Obama Era, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 803, 804–05 (2010) [hereinafter Mettler, Reconstitut-
ing the Submerged State] (defining the “submerged state” as one in which “policies . . . lay be-
neath the surface of US [sic] market institutions and within the federal tax system”); see also
Mettler, Transformed Welfare State, supra note 40, at 193, 202–03 (explaining how with one 
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policymaking renders its regressive qualities invisible to the public 
and its beneficiaries invisible to themselves. While legislators, pub-
lic policy experts, and tax lawyers understand that the home-
mortgage interest deduction and the Earned Income Tax credit 
constitute benefits with redistributive effects not unlike Social Se-
curity or Medicaid, most Americans are confounded by the tax 
code. As such, even the beneficiaries of the hidden welfare state (at 
least those who are not businesses) are unaware that government 
has done anything for them.230 The story for businesses, discussed 
below, is entirely different but in its own way exacerbates the vi-
cious cycle. 
The use of the tax code to make policy effectively obscures both 
the redistribution of benefits and the beneficiaries of redistribu-
tion. The results of the Social and Governmental Issues and Partic-
ipation Study of 2008 (2008 SGIPS) are especially revealing in this 
regard. One thousand four hundred Americans were asked wheth-
er they had “ever used a government social program.”231 These ini-
tial responses were compared to answers about usage of nineteen 
federal social policies, consciously chosen to include both entitle-
ment and tax programs.232 The vast majority of recipients of the 
most salient entitlement programs (e.g., Social Security Disability, 
Medicaid, Public Assistance, and Food Stamps) recognized that 
they had been the beneficiaries of a government social program.233
By contrast, over 50% of respondents who had used one of the six 
policies of the submerged state reported that they had never “used 
a government social program.”234 For example, 64.3% of those who 
reported taking advantage of a 529 College Savings Plan or Cover-
dell Education Savings Account denied having ever used “a gov-
ernment social program.”235 Other visible entitlement programs fell 
somewhere between these two extremes: 44.1% of recipients of So-
cial Security Retirement benefits, 43.0% of Unemployment bene-
                                                   
exception—the Earned Income Tax Credit—the hidden welfare state disproportionately 
benefits the wealthiest Americans). 
 230. See Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State, supra note 229, at 804 (noting that 
“such policies . . . shroud[] the state’s role, making it largely invisible to most ordinary citi-
zens, even [the] beneficiaries of existing policies”). 
 231. The polling was conducted via a national telephone survey of a random sample of 
1,000 Americans, with oversamples of 200 additional low-income Americans and 200 addi-
tional young Americans (aged 25–34). Id. at 808, 820 n.32. 
 232. Id. at 808. 
 233. Id. at 809 tbl.3 (noting that only 25.4%–28.7% of those who had used these enti-
tlement programs failed to respond in the affirmative to the initial question). 
 234. The submerged state programs within the list included: 529 College Savings Plan or 
Coverdell Education Savings Account, Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, Hope or Life-
time Learning Tax Credit, Student Loans, Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit, and the 
Earned Income Tax Credit. Id.
 235. Id.
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fits, 40.3% of the G.I. Bill, and 39.8% of Medicare recipients re-
ported not having received government benefits.236
This obfuscation would not matter if ordinary Americans did not 
care about distributional effects, but they do. The 2008 SGIPS 
found that when respondents received information explaining that 
the benefits of the home mortgage interest deduction largely ac-
crue to affluent households, “opposition grew sharply, particularly 
among those with low to moderate incomes and among liberals 
and Democrats,” whereas “support grew” for the Earned Income Tax 
Credit when it was explained that it helped households with low to 
moderate incomes.237 Indeed, it may not be an accident that politi-
cians have opted to implement policies that disproportionately 
benefit wealthier Americans through complicated tax incentives 
that render those benefits invisible. 
Invisibility with respect to both beneficiaries and effects has one 
further democratic drawback: it makes it incredibly difficult to or-
ganize or be organized.238 As Joe Soss and Lawrence R. Jacobs ob-
serve, since the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, American poli-
cymaking has “fostered atomized publics with little sense of what 
they have in common [or] . . . what is at stake in politics and gov-
ernment.”239 The middle-class recipients of both the home-
mortgage interest deduction and subsidized employer-sponsored 
health insurance do not see themselves as the beneficiaries of fed-
eral programs and are not organized to advocate on their behalf. 
The corporations and industries that benefit from these pro-
grams are not, however, similarly blind. As Mettler observes, even 
as the policy implications of the submerged state “elude[] most 
ordinary citizens,” the submerged state “has fostered the profitabil-
ity of particular industries and induced them to increase their po-
litical capacity . . . [in order] to maintain the status quo.”240 Indeed, 
the invulnerability of the subsidization of homeownership and em-
ployer-sponsored health insurance is a product of industry interest 
groups rather than the direct advocacy of the individual beneficiar-
ies. In some cases, this virtual representation is adequate to protect 
individual interest, but in most, it diverges. For example, federal 
policy in the late twentieth century sought to make college more 
                                                   
 236. Id.
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 238. Id. at 805; Mettler, Transformed Welfare State, supra note 40, at 212–17. 
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FALL 2019] Making and Unmaking Citizens 107
affordable for middle-class families through subsidized, private ed-
ucational loans—rather than distributing government support di-
rectly.241 The effect was to create an entrenched set of special inter-
ests opposed to any changes to the system, despite its well-known 
economic inefficiencies, including self-dealing between lenders 
and universities. In 2019, Congress changed the system to be more 
generous to beneficiaries by making the federal government the 
lender, but it was forced to make significant concessions to special 
interests: the new federal loans are originated by private lenders, 
who receive fees from the government for their services.242
Taken together, changes to the form of policymaking since the 
1980s have exacerbated the un-heavenliness of the chorus of politi-
cal interest. Neoliberal policymaking has exacerbated political ine-
quality not only as a matter of first-order policy preferences but al-
so because of its second-order effects on the democratic engage-
engagement and political capacity of ordinary Americans. The 
choice to distribute government largesse in a form that is invisible 
to most Americans has produced two effects that intersect to en-
hance the political power of corporate and moneyed elites: it has 
demobilized lower- and middle-income Americans, while simulta-
neously creating increased incentives for narrow business interests 
to mobilize. The result is that ordinary Americans have been dis-
empowered just as the incentives for corporate beneficiaries to or-
ganize in defense of their wins have increased. 
To make matters worse, the scaling back of New Deal entitle-
ment programs over the last thirty years has been partial and une-
ven, thereby further contributing to differential and unequal polit-
ical mobilization.243 Inroads into New Deal welfare policies as well 
as the expansion of the criminal justice system have contributed to 
the demobilization of the economically and racially marginalized, 
in particular. In this regard, it matters to our story that Social Secu-
                                                   
 241. In 1997, responding to the fact that federal grants were no longer keeping up with 
rising costs in higher education, Congress introduced the generous Hope Scholarship and 
Lifetime Learning Credit. In 2009, it upped the commitment appreciably with the adoption 
of the American Opportunity Tax Credit (“AOTC”), which made these credits available to 
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 242. See id. at 1–3, 6, 11 (arguing that education tax credits are too expensive and largely 
serve as a “windfall for universities” and recommending the expansion of Pell Grants and 
direct loans to those most in need of federal aid). 
 243. See, e.g., Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 112 (arguing that the “complex and une-
ven” changes in welfare policies since the 1970s “have worked to reverse [the] civic and po-
litical incorporation” of low- and middle-income Americans, including veterans). 
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rity and Medicare are the only major New Deal entitlement pro-
grams to have survived the deregulatory turn intact—at once a 
product of a strong organization and an explanation for seniors’ 
continued remarkable political engagement. 
C. Prescriptive Implications 
The critical prescriptive implication of this history of policy 
feedbacks is that legislative choices inevitably shape both individual 
political engagement and civil society. Without assuming that all 
civic associations ipso facto contribute to liberal democracy,244 we 
can thus take from the above discussion that legislative initiatives 
that are not directly focused on elections also constitute a critical 
point of entry for rebuilding the civic and political capacity of eve-
ryday Americans. 
Generosity, visibility, and universality are key to whether legisla-
tion enhances democratic responsiveness or undermines it.245
Form, in other words, determines the character of the democratic 
cycle. The visibility of generous, non-means tested benefits influ-
ences individual participation by making the value of government 
apparent to the beneficiaries.246 When individuals experience the 
utility of government, they are more likely to recognize the im-
portance of taking time to engage in politics.247 This, in turn, is 
likely to stimulate political solidarity and organizing. 
By contrast, programs that recipients experience as harsh, pa-
ternalistic, or stigmatizing undermine civic and political participa-
                                                   
 244. The KKK was one of the largest federated associations in the mid-twentieth century, 
and its anti-democratic history, including physical vote suppression, is common knowledge. 
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Soss, supra note 245, at 62.
 247. See, e.g., METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS, supra note 121, at 12–13.
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tion.248 The same is true for programs that are perceived as irra-
tional or poorly administered.249 Thus, the rate of political partici-
pation amongst those who are subject to Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) is significantly lower than other groups.250
More importantly, the low rates of participation are not fully ex-
plained by lower SES status, as the figures were much less dramatic 
in the mid-twentieth century when welfare programs were more 
generous.251
Jamila Michener’s recent study of Medicaid is particularly reveal-
ing in this regard. As expected, she found that beneficiaries of the 
program are “significantly less likely to vote, register, and partici-
pate more generally” compared to similarly situated individuals.252
However, she was able to demonstrate further that the magnitude 
of that effect differed in relation to differences in generosity and 
administration of the program between states.253 Summarizing her 
findings, she writes:
Beneficiaries living in states that expanded benefits in the 
previous year are significantly more likely to register and 
participate more generally; those living in states with a 
higher density of welfare employees are substantially more 
likely to register; those in states offering a wider scope of 
optional services are more likely to vote; [by contrast] those 
                                                   
 248. Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the Carceral State, 104 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 817 (2010) (finding that those who have been incarcerated are significantly 
less likely to vote, even after controlling for income and race); see also Mettler & Soss, supra
note 245, at 62 (contrasting evidence that attributes the political engagement of beneficiar-
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dence of the negative effects on political engagement of encounters with Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children and the criminal justice system).
 249. MICHENER, supra note 101, at 61–70.  
 250. Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 114–15. 
 251. Id. at 117. 
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affect mobilization (church attendance, incarceration, and health status, including depres-
sion and drug and alcohol dependence). Id. at 76–79. 
 253. Id. at 8 (explaining that “geographically differentiated political capacity” is a prod-
uct of stark differences in the generosity of state program provision as well as the tenor of 
administration). 
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living in states that have recently reduced benefits are sig-
nificantly less likely to participate, vote, and register.254
Put simply, Medicaid recipients “living in states offering a wide 
scope of services, fiscally equipped bureaucracies, and expanding 
Medicaid programs are significantly more likely to participate in 
politics,” while those living in states that had recently contracted 
services were significantly less politically involved.255 Michener 
notes, further, that how states treat so-called optional services 
(such as eye examinations and dental hygiene) proves among the 
most visible and communicative choices with respect to generosity 
or stinginess.256 Ultimately, she concludes that whether Medicaid is 
“a boom or a bust for political engagement” depends on the ways 
the program is formulated and implemented.257
Visibility of beneficiaries is similarly critical. Where the class of 
beneficiaries is evident, the incentives to mobilize and be mobi-
lized, including by the socioeconomic elites capable of affording 
the transaction costs of organization, are much more pro-
nounced.258 Once mobilized, such citizens are in a better position 
to demand responsiveness.259 In fact, some researchers attribute the 
recent decline in voter turnout among lower-income Americans 
not just to TANF but to the fact that political parties no longer feel 
the need to mobilize these voters.260
To be sure, visible beneficiaries provide a target for counter-
mobilization and scapegoating. That said, this dynamic is most 
problematic where visibility is differential. The problem today is 
the recipients of visible government benefits become ready targets 
for backlash, while those who receive the most from the federal 
government are hidden and out of range. 
                                                   
 254. Id. at 81. 
 255. Id. at 14; see also id. at 81–82 (“As shown, compared to beneficiaries living in states 
that did not reduce benefits, beneficiaries in states that had made the most reductions were 
between four and nine percentage points less likely to vote, register, or participate.”). 
 256. Id. at 52 (arguing that this is because vision and dental hygiene “are crucial for cop-
ing with everyday life and with the difficulties that affect low-income people”). 
 257. Id. at 14. Michener’s findings offer an additional basis to be wary of efforts to im-
pose cumbersome work requirements on Medicaid recipients. See Amy Goldstein, Kentucky 
Becomes the First State Allowed to Impose Medicaid Work Requirements, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/kentucky-becomes-the-first-state-
allowed-to-impose-medicaid-work-requirement/2018/01/12/b7b56e3e-f7b4-11e7-b34a-
b85626af34ef_story.html; see also Stewart v. Azar II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, (D.D.C. 2019) appeal 
docketed, 19-5095 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 11, 2019) (refusing to uphold reinstated policy on remand 
after striking initial requirements down as arbitrary and capricious). 
 258. Mettler, Transformed Welfare State, supra note 40, at 209–10 (noting that beneficiaries 
of visible and generous government largesse are much more likely to be represented by or-
ganizations and “much more likely to be mobilized by political parties and candidates,” re-
gardless of income, as compared to “beneficiaries of . . . weak policies”).
 259. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 42, at 117–24, 138–39. 
260. Mettler, Transformed Welfare State, supra note 40, at 204–12.
FALL 2019] Making and Unmaking Citizens 111
D. The Affordable Care Act as a Contemporary Case Study 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the various repeal and re-
place options that were discussed in August 2017 provide a con-
temporary illustration of the potential for substantive legislation to 
have positive democratic returns, while simultaneously illustrating 
the policy feedback analysis that Part III argues should inform de-
mocracy reformers’ agendas. 
The ACA is a hybrid of Reagan-era and more traditional New 
Deal policymaking. Certain elements of the law dispense direct 
government benefits and create visible beneficiaries, while others 
do not. The expansion of Medicaid and the ACA’s protection 
against rate discrimination based on preexisting conditions as well 
as its requirement that insurers permit dependents under twenty-
six to remain on their parents’ employer-based policies create visi-
ble benefits and beneficiaries. The host of benefits accruing to in-
dividuals with employer-sponsored health insurance, by contrast, 
remain largely invisible to the public. 
The ACA’s expansion of Medicaid illustrates the democratic re-
turns of the classic form of New Deal policymaking. Even with only 
thirty-one states and the District of Columbia adopting the expan-
sion, over 10 million Americans were newly insured as a result.261
The expansion was both visible and generous. Moreover, by simpli-
fying eligibility criteria and enhancing state incentives to enroll el-
igible individuals, the ACA appears to have improved participants’ 
experiences of program administration.262 Consistent with the liter-
ature, early data suggests that both the expansion of Medicaid and 
the passage of the ACA more broadly have had positive effects on 
political participation.263 Michener, for example, found that Medi-
caid recipients in states that had adopted the expansion were sig-
                                                   
 261. Cf. KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID EXPANSION ENROLLMENT,
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/medicaid-expansion-enrollment (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2019) (reporting that as of September 30, 2017, 32 states (including D.C.) 
had expanded Medicaid eligibility resulting in coverage for over 12 million Americans). 
 262. Cf. Tricia Brooks, The ACA Transformed Medicaid Enrollment Processes. Rolling Them 
Back Would Wreak Havoc, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hblog20170104.058223/full/ (explaining how the ACA has “transform[ed] 
Medicaid into an efficient, modernized data-driven program”). 
 263. See, e.g., Joshua D. Clinton & Michael W. Sances, The Politics of Policies: The Initial 
Mass Political Effects of Medicaid Expansion in the States, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 167, 168 (2018) 
(finding that “the expansion of Medicaid increased voter registration” in both 2014 and 
2016, had a limited effect on voter turnout in 2014, but had no effect on turnout in 2016); 
Jake Haselswerdt, Expanding Medicaid, Expanding the Electorate: The Affordable Care Act’s Short-
Term Impact on Political Participation, 42 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 667, 668, 681, 686 (2017) 
(finding that expanded enrollment in Medicaid as a result of the ACA “significantly corre-
lated with higher voter turnout in 2014 US [sic] House elections,” even after controlling for 
a wide range of variables, and hypothesizing that this is because the Act motivated “both 
beneficiaries and opponents” to vote). 
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nificantly more likely to have registered to vote or to have partici-
pated in some other way in the following election cycle.264
Not surprisingly, when repeal efforts began, beneficiaries and 
other mediating advocacy groups were well positioned to mobilize 
against the proposed repeal, attending hundreds of rallies and 
town hall meetings to share their personal stories.265 Indeed, Mich-
ener’s qualitative research vividly depicts stories of individual activ-
ism giving birth to grassroots advocacy by beneficiaries of Medicaid 
during various stages of the ACA fight.266
Those 10 million, newly insured Americans knew exactly whom 
to thank for their eyeglasses and their prescriptions.267 Some likely 
even noticed the ease with which they were able to register for 
Medicaid coverage.268 Equally importantly, Democrats, state gover-
nors, and an array of other advocacy groups—including those of 
healthcare professionals—knew exactly whom to organize in their 
effort to save the Act. 
The repeal of Medicaid expansion along with efforts to replace 
the system with block grants ultimately failed. Congressional Re-
publicans retreated in the face of significant grassroots and elite 
opposition, including among Republican governors.269 In the face 
of mounting political opposition to the scaling back of a visible 
benefit, an array of compromises, including a delayed repeal of the 
ACA’s expansion of Medicaid, were considered.270 None passed. 
                                                   
 264. MICHENER, supra note 101, at 80–82. 
 265. Id. at 11–12. 
 266. Id. at 136–52 (describing the organizing efforts of one beneficiary, who not only 
orchestrated a bus for beneficiaries to attend hearings at the state legislature, but also 
trained others to be effective political advocates). 
 267. See, e.g., Nick Castele, Meet the Republican Governors Who Don’t Want to Repeal All of 
Obamacare, NPR (Jan. 23, 2017, 4:53 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/23/510823789/
meet-the-republican-governors-who-dont-want-to-repeal-all-of-obamacare. 
 268. See Brooks, supra note 262 (noting that eligibility in some states is verified “immedi-
ately or overnight for more than 75% of applicants”). 
 269. See Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Republican Unity on Health Care Is Elusive, Despite 
Trump’s Support, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/
us/politics/affordable-care-act-health-care-trump.html (noting that “[l]awmakers from 
states that expanded Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act face pressure back home—in 
some cases, from Republican governors—” to oppose its repeal); Castele, supra note 267 
(noting that the eleven Republican governors from states that chose to expand Medicaid are 
lobbying to keep it and highlighting Governor Kasich’s efforts on behalf of the 700,000 
Ohioans who have received coverage through the expansion). 
 270. Amy Goldstein et al., Health-Care Bill Changes: For Conservatives, Moderates and New 
Yorkers, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2017); Margot Sanger-Katz, G.O.P. Repeal Bill Would Cut Fund-
ing for Poor and Taxes on Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/03/06/upshot/gop-health-bill-would-cut-funding-for-poor-and-taxes-on-rich.html; 
Timothy Jost, A Look at Republican Intentions? Diving Into The Leaked ACA Replacement Bill,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20170225.058932/full/; see also Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin, House GOP Plans to 
Keep Some Medicaid Expansion—And Steer Money to States that Never Bought In, WASH. POST (Feb. 
24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/house-gop-plans-to-
keep-some-medicaid-expansion—and-steer-money-to-states-that-never-bought-
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To be sure, the expansion of Medicaid was so visible and per-
ceived to be so generous that it created resentment—particularly, 
among individuals who felt that they had been forced to purchase 
more expensive, less generous coverage through the private ex-
changes.271 Still, to the degree that this resentment bred activism, it 
was not, per se, a democratic drawback. Indeed, some supporters of 
repeal have expressed hope that the Act will be replaced with a 
broader expansion of Medicaid to offer “the working poor a 
chance at the same coverage the very poor receive.”272
In other respects, however, the ACA was a quintessential exam-
ple of American policymaking in the post-Reagan era, with invisi-
bility undermining political mobilization. Its least visible benefi-
ciaries are the approximately 150 million Americans who receive 
coverage through employer-based health insurance plans. Even 
relatively informed citizens are unlikely to recognize the range of 
protections they received from the ACA: for example, the re-
quirement that health plans cover preventative care services with-
out patients either meeting plan deductibles or paying a co-pay; 
the introduction of out-of-pocket limits to cap the dollar amount 
individuals can be expected to pay in co-payments annually; and 
the prohibition on annual and lifetime benefit limits.273 These indi-
viduals are also largely unaware of the indirect benefits they have 
received from the ACA in the form of the lowest increases in 
health insurance premiums in decades. Most importantly, these 
individuals are unlikely to fully understand how the robust cover-
age, at relatively low costs, that they take for granted is subsidized 
by federal tax policy that long pre-dates the ACA.274 Not surprising-
                                                   
in/2017/02/24/b23cb9f0-f9f7-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html (reporting that a Kaiser 
Family Foundation poll found 84% of respondents support Medicaid expansion and favor 
its preservation and, further, that support for the expansion was 87% in the sixteen states 
with Republican governors that expanded Medicaid under the ACA). 
 271. Sarah Kliff, Why Obamacare Enrollees Voted for Trump, VOX (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/12/13/13848794/kentucky-obamacare-
trump (reporting that, in interviews, Trump supporters enrolled through the exchanges 
expressed frustration that those on Medicaid are “getting even better, even cheaper bene-
fits”). 
 272. Id.; see also Drew Altman, Opinion, The Health Care Plan Trump Voters Really Want,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/opinion/the-health-care-
plan-trump-voters-really-want.html (reporting similar findings from a Kaiser Family Founda-
tion focus group-based study of Trump supporters enrolled in either Medicaid or private 
insurance through the exchanges). 
 273. JoAnn Volk, Get Health Insurance Through Your Employer? ACA Repeal Will Affect You, 
Too, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20170111.058297/full/. 
 274. See Chris Ladd, Unspeakable Realities Block Universal Health Coverage in America, FORBES
(Mar. 13, 2017, 2:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisladd/2017/03/13/
unspeakable-realities-block-universal-health-coverage-in-the-us/#399070f4186a (describing 
the submerged state and the ways it benefits white Americans employed in the private sec-
tor, including by making their health insurance more affordable). 
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ly, then, there has been much less activism against the repeal of the 
ACA from healthy individuals who receive health insurance 
through work. 
Between these two extremes was the ACA’s introduction of gov-
ernment-run health insurance exchanges. A hybrid policymaking 
structure, the exchanges marry elements of the Reagan school with 
elements of the New Deal approach. The Act creates exchanges in 
which private insurers compete to provide health insurance to in-
dividuals who are unable to obtain coverage through their employ-
ers and are ineligible for Medicaid or Medicare. These private ex-
changes, like the ability of individuals to use them, are subsidized 
by the government. For individuals, subsidies are provided on a 
means-test basis through an array of tax credits.275
Despite the provision of subsidies through the tax code, the ex-
changes have been visible—but also confusing and fraught with 
administrative hiccups.276 Similarly, the so-called individual man-
date, the requirement that individuals obtain health insurance or 
pay a penalty, which was meant to both encourage participation in 
the exchanges and stabilize insurance prices, also proved excep-
tionally visible.277
While an estimated 9.2 million Americans have been insured 
through these exchanges,278 the jury remains hung on the question 
of generosity and efficacy. And still, the policy feedback loop from 
these exchanges has surely been positive, where the measure is po-
litical engagement and mobilization. Those who have gained (or 
been required to obtain) health insurance through the exchanges 
know full well who to hold responsible and have made their voices 
heard loudly and often since 2010. Moreover, both political parties 
have been moved to organize Americans whose experiences of the 
exchanges comports with the party’s platform. 
                                                   
 275. In general, tax credits are significantly more universal than either tax deductions 
(which require itemization) or health savings accounts. These latter tax options tend to be 
used by higher-income Americans. Tax credits, especially when they are advanceable and 
refundable, are also more visible because they come to individuals as a sum of money from 
the government. In fact, Senator Rand Paul, during the repeal debate, objected: “I think 
refundable tax credits are just another word for subsidies.” Kaplan & Pear, supra note 269. 
 276. Despite being visible, there has been a good deal of confusion about the ACA. See
Jeff Lagasse, Americans Are Still Confused About Healthcare Law, Survey Finds, HEALTHCARE FIN.
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/americans-still-confused-
about-healthcare-law-survey-finds.  
 277. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 547–59 (2012) (describing 
the thrust of Congress’s policy rationale for the individual mandate). 
 278. ObamaCare Subsidies, OBAMACARE FACTS (Aug. 8, 2014), http://obamacarefacts.com/
obamacare-subsidies/ (last updated Feb. 21, 2019) (reporting, in addition, that 85% of indi-
viduals who purchased health insurance through the private exchanges received some gov-
ernment subsidy). 
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The politics surrounding efforts to repeal the ACA in the fall of 
2017 are a testament to the political power of visibility and gener-
osity as well as the importance of giving political parties, and their 
civic allies, an incentive to help mobilize their constituents—to all 
the dynamics described above, that is.279 To be sure, the Act main-
tained and encouraged many vested interests, including hospitals, 
doctors, and insurers, all of whom were active during the debate. 
But special interest lobbying, as we know, looks different when in-
dividual activism and organizational advocacy is present.280 The end 
result was a fluid political contest with individuals showing up at 
town halls and rallies to plead their cases. The AARP’s intervention 
was also critical to thwarting the repeal.281
Ultimately, despite control of all three branches of government 
and a longstanding platform promising repeal, spearheaded by key 
donors, a Republican-led Congress was not able to repeal and re-
place the ACA. 
Not only did the effort to scale back existing entitlements fail, 
but shortly after it tacked a repeal of the tax penalties associated 
with the individual mandate to the 2017 Republican tax bill, a Re-
publican Congress was forced to concede to fully fund CHIP for a 
decade.
The story of the effort to repeal the ACA and its failure consti-
tutes a significant political win for low- and middle-income Ameri-
cans—a win that should not be underestimated even as the ACA 
remains vulnerable and our politics remains polarized and fluid. It 
stands as a tribute to the civic and political returns from visible en-
titlement programs. By the same token, it raises democratic alarms 
about efforts in some states to impose work requirements and oth-
er conditions on eligibility that are likely to subvert messages of in-
clusion and citizenship. 
                                                   
 279. See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, In Red-State Utah, a Surge Toward Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/health/utah-obamacare.html; Thomas 
Kaplan, Angry Town Hall Meetings on Health Care Law, and Few Answers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/13/us/politics/affordable-care-act-sensenbrenner-
republicans.html. 
 280. Robert Pear, Repeal of Health Law Faces a New Hurdle: Older Americans, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/05/us/politics/health-care-law-obamacare-
repeal-older-americans.html; Margot Sanger-Katz, Why Even Some Republicans Are Rejecting the 
Replacement Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/
upshot/why-even-some-republicans-are-rejecting-the-replacement-bill.html; accord GILENS,
AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE, supra note 11, at 121–22. 
 281. Pear, supra note 280 (reporting how, in the middle of the debate, the organization 
produced data showing, among other things, that seniors on the cusp of Medicare eligibility 
(i.e., between 50–55) would face a $2,000–$3,000 increase in premiums under Republican 
proposals). 
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* * *
Moving again from the details of policy feedbacks to their pre-
scriptive relevance, the critical point is that legislation does far 
more than distribute or deny benefits and rights to individuals. It 
also shapes individual relationships to democracy, creates political 
constituencies, and stimulates civic organization. 
Form matters. Policy ends can be achieved in ways that either 
enhance democratic responsiveness by “stimulat[ing] political or-
ganizations, solidarity, and accountability” or undermine it by fos-
tering individual anomie and corporate rent-seeking.282 In this way, 
legislative choices inevitably shape civil society and political en-
gagement at both an individual and organizational level. 
III. NEW STRATEGIES FOR DEMOCRACY REFORMS
Just as the demise of American democracy was not, and still is 
not, inevitable, its restoration is similarly neither inevitable nor 
foreclosed. Those interested in restoring functionality to our dem-
ocratic institutions must, however, broaden our horizons. 
The foundational insight from the previous section is that legis-
lation, regardless of its substantive area, will play some role in the 
trajectory of civil society. Legislation can either engage citizens and 
incentivize the creation of civic groups, or it can breed political 
disengagement, demobilization, and anomie. Indeed, the present 
political incapacity of Main Street is importantly a product of the 
form and extent of deregulation over the past thirty years. 
The task, therefore, is to identify those legislative policies that 
could tip the scale toward political empowerment and civic reor-
ganization. Any effort to restore our democracy and fuel the recent 
signs of civic revival must include the pursuit of policies that will 
likely motivate individuals to participate in our democracy and 
stimulate the reorganization of the interests of everyday Ameri-
cans. This appreciation is especially critical given mounting evi-
dence that the Roberts Court is disinclined to maintain established 
approaches to good governance reforms, which have depended on 
judicial intervention to reinforce democracy by increasing ballot 
                                                   
 282. Soss & Jacobs, supra note 49, at 110 (arguing this is one of four major ways that pub-
lic policies can affect political engagement); see also Mettler & Soss, supra note 245, at 62–63 
(arguing for further research into the ways public policies influence political organization 
and capacity).
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access, limiting political entrenchment, and restricting the influ-
ence of money on elections.283
The analyses in the previous two sections provide yardsticks for 
the sorts of non-procedural policies that should be central to the 
broader democracy reform platform. In particular, they suggest 
that the priority should be legislative opportunities that would: 
Draw a broader, more representative, and diverse 
swath of Americans into politics, particularly individu-
als who are low- and middle-income or young. 
Spawn civic and political networks that span econom-
ic, racial, partisan, and geographic divides.284
Offset the socioeconomic and racial segregation of 
contemporary life that undermines opportunities for 
individuals to associate across these axes of difference. 
Stimulate the growth of economically self-sustaining, 
membership-based civic associations that prioritize 
democratic governance structures and operate in eve-
ry state (whether through a formally federated struc-
ture or otherwise). 
Once specific legislative policies addressing these criteria have 
been identified, reformers must advocate forcefully to ensure that 
they are implemented in generous, universal, and visible ways and are
fairly and competently administered.285 By the same token, versions of 
such policies that distribute government largesse in ways that ob-
scure either the fact of the benefit or who benefits should be 
strongly opposed, as should policy choices and menus that lead to 
differential disempowerment.286
                                                   
 283. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 
U.S. 185 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Crawford v. Marion Cty. Elec-
tion Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 284. A goal of racially integrated social networks may not actually be a partisan-neutral 
goal, as the Republican Party’s current agenda is increasingly associated with nostalgia for a 
period of white supremacy. See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, Nearly Half of White Republicans 
Say It Bothers Them to Hear People Speaking Foreign Languages, WASH. POST (May 8, 2019). In 
early drafts, in deference to that reality, I emphasized socioeconomic integration, even as I 
personally favor the goal of pursuing racially and socioeconomically integrated social net-
works. That decision, however, consistently alienated many potential allies, so I have decided 
to abandon that aspect of partisan neutrality. 
 285. See supra notes 245–260 and accompanying text. 
 286. This is best conceptualized as a rebuttable presumption against disguised policy-
making. The presumption could be rebutted when there are genuine policy reasons to pre-
fer invisibility (as, for example, in 2010 when tax relief sought to stimulate economic 
growth) or when it is simply infeasible to gain support for a visible alternative. The latter 
justification should be undertaken with caution since, if exercised liberally, it would do sig-
nificant harm to our democracy. In this regard, my view is that policymaking should be un-
dertaken with two principles in mind: first, do no harm; second, do good where opportunity exists.
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A. Engaging a Broader Swath of the Electorate 
Let’s start first with legislative proposals that could potentially 
draw young as well as low- and middle-income Americans into poli-
tics. These could include efforts to make college education free 
and to expand the availability of government health insurance. 
Felon re-enfranchisement as well as legislation offering paths to cit-
izenship for undocumented immigrants could also further this 
goal. 
The variety of efforts at the state and local level to make higher 
education more accessible nicely illustrate the promises of those 
reforms as well as what would be necessary to fully capture the po-
tential civic returns. A college degree is currently the great dividing 
line when it comes to economic resilience and success over a life-
time.287 Indeed, some researchers argue that college access is an ex-
tremely effective anti-poverty strategy for poor and working parents 
insofar as it lifts families out of poverty and children out of the cy-
cle of poverty.288 At the same time, the rising cost of higher educa-
tion has put college out of reach for many families. It even burdens 
middle and upper-middle class families. Student debt constitutes 
the highest proportion of consumer debt in an era of declining 
household incomes.289
Starting with Tennessee, several states and localities have acted 
to address the college affordability crisis. In 2015, Tennessee be-
came the first state to make community college free to high school 
graduates who complete eight hours of community service, attend 
mentorship meetings each semester, and maintain a minimum 
grade-point average.290 Since then, sixteen states have followed 
                                                   
 287. BRAD HERSHBEIN ET AL., HAMILTON PROJECT, INCREASING EDUCATION: WHAT IT
WILL AND WILL NOT DO FOR EARNINGS AND EARNINGS INEQUALITY 1 (Mar. 30, 2015), 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/impact_of_edu
_earnings_inequality_hershbein_kearney_summers.pdf (describing diverging earning 
trends for those with and without a college degree and noting “lifetime earnings of workers 
with a college degree are nearly twice as high as those without one”). 
 288. See id. at 3 (clarifying that while increasing educational attainment will not close 
“the gap between the rich and the middle—or between the exorbitantly rich and the merely 
rich,” it is likely to “improve the economic position of those around and below the middle of 
the current earnings distribution”). 
 289. See No Jargon: The Cost of College, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Sept. 5, 2017), 
http://nojargon.libsyn.com/page/5/size/25 (noting student loan debt as the most signifi-
cant form of consumer loan debt despite the fact that most individuals owe relatively small 
amounts given caps on the amount of debt available for an undergraduate degree); see also
Hodge & Pomerleau, supra note 241, at 5 (noting that student loan debt, which averages just 
below $25,000, “is now the largest single type of outstanding debt, larger than both credit 
card debt and auto loan debt”). 
 290. Katie Loboscho, Tennessee Is Picking Up the Tab for Community College Students, CNN 
(Sept. 18, 2015, 10:07 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/09/18/pf/college/free-
community-college-tennessee/ (estimating 15,000 students would take advantage of the 
FALL 2019] Making and Unmaking Citizens 119
suit.291 New York recently adopted a program that provides free col-
lege tuition at SUNY and CUNY to families earning up to $125,000 
a year. Nearly a million households will be eligible for the pro-
gram, although policymakers assume that many fewer will use it.292
Similar programs have been adopted at the local level.293
As the research described in Part II suggests, there is good rea-
son to believe such programs hold the potential for positive civic 
returns. Not only will the beneficiaries of free community college 
be better educated (and thus more likely to participate in politics), 
but, like the beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill before them, they will 
likely be appreciative, and possibly even grateful, to the govern-
ment. Once established, moreover, such programs are likely to 
stimulate the growth of organizations to maintain them. Political 
parties, meanwhile, will likely begin to attend to this new political 
constituency. These programs may have a lower civic impact, com-
pared to the G.I. Bill, because many are structured to cycle partici-
pants every two years. Still, there is good reason to believe that a 
useful education, made possible by the support of the government, 
will promote trust as well as interest in government and politics. 
But the same research comes with a critical caution: the civic re-
turns of such programs will hinge on both generosity and imple-
mentation. The most significant problem with the design of many 
of these early programs—where the measure is generosity—is the 
requirement that individuals attend college as full-time students to 
qualify for the program. This renders the program inaccessible for 
many students who can only afford to attend college on a part-time 
basis. 
An additional, but less obvious, limitation of most existing pro-
grams is their failure to offer comparable benefits to youth who are 
                                                   
program during its first year and explaining that the program is funded by the state lottery 
fund).
 291. JEN MISHORY, THE FUTURE OF STATEWIDE COLLEGE PROMISE PROGRAMS: A STATE 
GUIDE TO FREE COLLEGE, CENTURY FOUND. 1 (2018), https://production-
tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2018/03/16161350/Jen_PromiseFinal2-1.pdf. 
 292. See Editorial Board, Opinion, A Promising Proposal for Free Tuition, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/opinion/a-promising-proposal-for-
free-tuition.html (estimating that while 940,000 families could qualify, it is likely only 
200,000 students would use the program if adopted); see also Governor Andrew J. Cuomo, 
Press Release, Governor Cuomo Presents 1st Proposal of 2017 State of the State: Making College Tui-
tion-Free for New York’s Middle Class Families (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/
news/governor-cuomo-presents-1st-proposal-2017-state-state-making-college-tuition-free-new-
york-s (explaining the program would cover costs remaining after federal and state TAP 
grants are applied). 
 293. See Farran Powell, Which Cities Offer Tuition-Free College Programs, U.S. NEWS
(Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-for-college/
articles/2018-05-02/see-which-cities-offer-tuition-free-college-programs (noting that twenty-
six of the fifty largest cities in the United States offer such programs). 
120 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:1 
not college bound.294 This coverage gap is likely to further political 
polarizations, similar to the response some Americans had to the 
limited expansion of Medicaid under the ACA.295 Where college is 
increasingly viewed as a badge of liberal elitism, rather than a 
known path to economic mobility and security, this civic risk 
should not be underestimated.296
In this regard, attention to the student debt crisis should not 
come at the expense of the broader need for affordable quality 
skills training.297 Indeed, the G.I. Bill’s greatest civic returns came 
from its support of educational opportunities below a four-year col-
lege degree. Ultimately, given the difficulties of policing the quality 
of training programs, community college may be the appropriate 
venue for offering high-quality job training and a path to well-
paying middle-skill jobs.298 But this will require state investment 
since many existing community college programs would need to be 
redesigned to offer high-quality job training and skills for the 
trades that are in demand.299 Virginia’s New Economy Workforce 
grant to community colleges to provide training in certain high-
demand fields, including healthcare and welding, may offer a 
model.300
                                                   
 294. See, e.g., Anne Kim, Forget “Free College” How About “Free Credentials”? 2017 
PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST. 1 (arguing that “the single-minded focus on college diminishes 
other, equally viable paths to middle-class security” and “sends the wrong message to the 
millions of Americans who opt out of college—not because they can’t afford it but [because 
they] don’t want it or need it to achieve their aspirations”). 
 295. See supra notes 272–73 (discussing resentment towards the gap between cost and 
generosity of insurance available through Medicaid as compared to the state exchanges). 
 296. Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Closing of the Republican Mind, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/opinion/republicans-elites-trump.html (re-
porting a stark rise, since 2016, in skepticism among Republicans about the value of college, 
with 58% now reporting a negative view of higher education). 
 297. JEN MISHORY, EXPANDING “FREE COLLEGE”: HOW TO BUILD A JOB TRAINING 
GUARANTEE, CENTURY FOUND. (May 8, 2019), https://tcf.org/content/report/expanding-
free-college-build-job-training-guarantee/ (arguing that a “universally accessible training 
benefit would allow more workers to access higher-wage job opportunities”); PETER 
GRANVILLE, CALIFORNIA’S WORKFORCE NEEDS CAL GRANT REFORM, CENTURY FOUND. (Feb. 
25, 2019), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/californias-workforce-needs-cal-grant-
reform/. 
 298. Kim, supra note 294, at 8; see also Mishory, supra note 297 (identifying scale and 
quality control as significant impediments to scaling up quality skills training initiatives). 
 299. See, e.g., HARRY J. HOLZER, JOB MARKET POLARIZATION AND U.S. WORKER SKILLS: A
TALE OF TWO MIDDLES, 2, 7 BROOKINGS INST. (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/polarization_jobs_policy_holzer.pdf (noting that “a majority of 
AA enrollees in recent years have concentrated in ‘liberal studies’ or ‘general studies’ with 
virtually no labor market return”); see also Anthony Walsh, States Continue to Push Ahead on 
Free College, CENTURY FOUND. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/states-
continue-push-ahead-free-college/ (noting that many state financial aid programs exclude 
community college vocational programs). 
 300. Kim, supra note 294, at 7. It is also likely that programs will need to be place-based 
to be valuable. Growing evidence points to regional differences regarding employers’ will-
ingness to offer non-college educated applicants middle-skills jobs. Cf. Mels de Zeeuw, Une-
ven Opportunity: Variation in Employers’ Educational Preferences for Middle-Skills Jobs, FED. RES.
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Additionally, programs need to address the economic realities of 
the individuals seeking to utilize these programs. First and fore-
most, they should cover non-tuition costs for low-income students 
who either cannot rely on family support or who have families to 
support (as the G.I. Bill did).301 Programs like San Francisco’s and 
Maine’s are potential models in this regard. San Francisco offers 
free tuition to all city residents who enroll in the City College of 
San Francisco, regardless of age or income, while providing sup-
plemental assistance to low-income students to cover books, health 
insurance, and other fees.302 Similarly, Maine’s 2017 Lift 2.0 pro-
gram was carefully designed to address the known needs of work-
ing parents, including childcare and transportation costs (again, 
not unlike the G.I Bill, which had a stipend for family members).303
On an encouraging note, a recent review suggests that, at least, 
some states may be working to address these issues.304
Finally, regardless of their generosity, such programs must at-
tend to administrative implementation if they wish to secure long-
term civic returns. As Michener’s work on Medicaid demonstrates, 
programs that are implemented through rules that are perceived 
as arbitrary will not achieve second-order civic and democratic re-
turns.305 In this regard, several concerns that have already been 
raised about the administration of the New York program are 
troubling. Critically, the New York program operates with exceed-
ingly narrow criteria for determining which courses satisfy the full-
time eligibility requirement. As such, meeting this requirement has 
been a significant source of anxiety for many students. 
In sum, moves to make higher education more affordable and 
accessible have the potential to draw a wider swath of citizens into 
civil society and politics. So do programs aimed at providing uni-
                                                   
BANK ATLANTA (Feb. 2017), https://www.frbatlanta.org/community-development/
publications/partners-update/2017/01/170125-uneven-opportunity-variation-in-employers-
educational-preferences-for-middle-skills-jobs.aspx (summarizing a study showing significant 
regional variation in “the availability and accessibility of well-paying jobs that do not require 
a bachelor’s degree” and explaining that employers in regions with more educated work-
forces and higher wages tend to require a bachelor degree for middle-skills jobs, such as in 
computing and nursing). 
301. Cf. METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS, supra note 121, at 70, 88. 
 302. Dave Berndtson, San Francisco Becomes First City to Offer Free Community College Tuition
to All Residents, PBS NEWS HOUR (Feb. 8, 2017, 9:52 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
education/san-francisco-becomes-first-city-offer-free-community-college-tuition-residents 
(reporting that the Mayor estimates the program will assist between 28,000–30,000 students 
at a cost of about $5.4 million annually). 
 303. See James Myall, ‘Lift 2.0’ Bill Will Pave the Way Out of Poverty for Many Mainers,
BEACON (Feb. 20, 2018), http://mainebeacon.com/lift-2-0-bill-will-pave-the-way-out-of-
poverty-for-many-mainers/. 
 304. Walsh, supra note 299 (noting Massachusetts and Hawaii’s expansion of debt-free 
college programs). 
 305. Cf. MICHENER, supra note 101, at 61–70. 
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versal access to quality healthcare and granting legal status to un-
documented immigrants. However, legislators constructing these 
programs must take care to ensure that they are designed more 
like the G.I. Bill and less like Medicaid. The same analyses apply to 
felon re-enfranchisement. The imposition of administrative hur-
dles, such as requiring individuals to pay all fines associated with 
their conviction as a prerequisite to eligibility to vote, like cumber-
some work requirements to receive Medicaid, or rigid full-time en-
rollment criteria, communicate unequal citizenship and undercut 
the potential of such policies to stimulate civic engagement among 
a broader, more representative swath of Americans.306
B. Building Coalitions Across Existing Divides 
Democracy reformers should also identify legislative opportuni-
ties with the potential to create constituencies that span economic, 
partisan, and geographic divides. Such opportunities include 
providing free educational opportunities, paid family and medical 
leave, and access to quality affordable healthcare, including mental 
health and addiction care. 
Postal banking, while not in the foreground for many people, 
offers an underappreciated opportunity to bridge the geographic 
divide between rural and urban communities with the added virtue 
that it is currently not a politically polarized issue.307 Many com-
mercial banks have abandoned both rural areas and impoverished 
urban neighborhoods as a result of both deregulation and techno-
logical advances. Concerned about profit margins, these banks 
have also jettisoned critical products from these communities, in-
cluding small loans to local businesses and low-income customers. 
The result according to a 2013 study is that 28% of households in 
the United States are “unbanked” (no formal relationship with a 
bank) or “underbanked” (no access to incremental credit).308 In 
low-income urban areas, “fringe lenders” have emerged to take the 
place of these regulated banks. Fringe lenders charge high interest 
rates and fees. Many perceive these lenders to be taking advantage 
of low-income customers. 
                                                   
 306. See Patricia Mazzei, Floridians Gave Ex-Felons the Right to Vote. Lawmakers Just Put a Big 
Obstacle in Their Way, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/us/
florida-felon-voting-amendment-4.html. 
 307. See also GILMAN & RAHMAN, supra note 161, at 3 (arguing that we need to seek out 
opportunities “to build multi-racial constituencies and alliances to make our democracy 
more inclusive”—a “type of ‘us’ populism” to replace a “‘them’ populism”). 
 308. Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483, 485 
(2013).
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A number of legal academics have proposed that postal banking 
could step in to replace low-income families’ reliance on check-
cashing services, payday lenders, and title vendors, each of whom 
collect fees and interest far beyond what chartered banks may 
charge.309 Professor Mehrsa Baradaran, most prominently, has ar-
gued that post offices could offer the same services that fringe 
lenders currently offer, as well as depository accounts at much low-
er costs.310 She defends postal banking as more efficient than im-
posing the responsibility for serving the needs of low-income cus-
tomers on mainstream banks.311 For one, the Post Office already 
has offices in the low-income areas that commercial banks have va-
cated. For another, the Post Office is a highly familiar and trusted 
place in many American communities. In April 2018, Senator 
Kirsten Gillibrand introduced legislation that mirrors Baradaran’s 
proposal.312
Although there is a good deal of debate regarding the risks asso-
ciated with the Post Office getting involved in micro-lending,313 the 
provision of depository services (i.e., checking and savings ac-
counts, debit cards, ATMs, and online banking and bill payment) 
through the Post Office may be a viable solution to the banking 
needs of individuals and businesses in both urban and rural com-
munities.314 This is because, while rural businesses mainly suffer 
from an inability to obtain credit lines and loans, they share with 
low-income urban communities the negative consequences that 
follow from the lack of access to depository accounts.315
For our purposes, however, what is critical is that the potential 
second-order democratic consequences of postal banking should 
not be ignored in this policy debate. Postal banking would be a 
                                                   
 309. See, e.g., Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 165
(2014).
 310. Id. at 168–70 (emphasizing historical precedent for her proposal in the Postal Sav-
ings System, which was established to encourage individual saving and operated from 1910 
to 1966). 
 311. Id. at 167–69. 
 312. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, Press Release, Gillibrand Announces Major New Legislation 
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 313. Many who have expressed doubt about postal banking are wary of the risks associat-
ed with offering low-income people loans at rates well below those justified based on the risk 
of default.
314. Cf. Ruth Simon & Coulter James, Goodbye, George Bailey: Decline of Rural Lending 
Crimps Small-Town Business, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
goodbye-george-bailey-decline-of-rural-lending-crimps-small-town-business-1514219515. 
 315. Cf. id. (emphasizing that rural businesses suffer from significant problems getting 
credit lines and loans, but noting they also suffer from the basic problem of not having easy 
access to depository accounts).
124 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:1 
highly visible government program that many individuals would di-
rectly experience. More importantly, it would create a beneficiary 
class that spans urban-rural political divides, even if the legislation 
did not go so far as to permit the Post Office to undertake micro-
lending. To the degree the experience was positive, it could instill 
renewed faith in the federal government and cross-regional alli-
ances. Whenever an urban or rural individual or business owner 
used a Post Office to cash a check, deposit money, or take out a 
loan, they would unavoidably recognize and appreciate that they 
were interacting with the federal government. By contrast, the 
most prominent alternative solutions to the banking problem 
(administering federal banking through the Federal Reserve, fed-
erally subsidized credit unions, savings and loan associations, and 
Morris Banks) would not provide similar visibility and transparency 
and, therefore, are significantly less likely to create positive policy 
feedbacks. Similar considerations should inform the debates when 
policies with similar bridging potential are discussed. 
C. Reducing Socioeconomic Segregation 
The most intractable constraint that efforts to revitalize a robust 
civil society will have to navigate is the rise of pervasive socioeco-
nomic segregation.316 In recent decades, mixed-income neighbor-
hoods have become increasingly rare, while “exclusively affluent 
and exclusively poor neighborhoods” have become the norm.317
This socioeconomic segregation undermines the democratic vir-
tues of civil society in a variety of ways and sets a third priority for 
good government reformers. 
Socioeconomic segregation means that there are simply fewer 
opportunities to forge social ties across classes—and, in turn, rac-
                                                   
 316. See, e.g., SEAN F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, THE CONTINUING INCREASE IN 
INCOME SEGREGATION, 2007-2012, 9–10, STANFORD CTR. FOR EDUC. POLICY ANALYSIS (2016), 
https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/the%20continuing%20increase%20in%20inc
ome%20segregation%20march2016.pdf (reporting that the rise in residential income seg-
regation, which began in the 1980s, continues to increase and that “rising income inequality 
continues to be a key factor leading to increasing residential segregation by income” in met-
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 317. Robert J. Sampson, Opinion, Division Street, U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26. 2013), 
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mixed income neighborhoods became less common” and that working- middle- and upper-
middle-class families have been increasingly sorted into distinct neighborhoods). 
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es.318 When parents volunteer in their children’s classrooms, attend 
parent-teacher association meetings, or coach Little League, they 
are unlikely to come into contact with parents from widely differ-
ent socioeconomic backgrounds. Residential segregation by in-
come also undermines the integrative potential of public schools.319
Moreover, to the degree that political participation is important-
ly social, socioeconomic segregation exacerbates existing inequali-
ties in civic and political participation.320 As Soss and Jacobs ex-
plain, the likelihood of “participat[ing] in politics depend[s] on 
the interactions” individuals have “in families, peer groups, neigh-
borhoods, workplaces, religious organizations, and community 
groups.”321 When the politically disadvantaged are isolated from 
peers privileged in the political game by education, wealth, and po-
litical knowledge, the losses for those individuals multiply. Soss and 
Jacobs continue: 
The advantages that flow from individual resources and 
skills are compounded by the returns that accrue from liv-
ing in a community where political information is plentiful 
and organizations engage local residents. Conversely, living 
in deeply disadvantaged neighborhoods both imposes 
harsh conditions and removes critical communities and 
networks . . . that might bolster skills and opportunity for 
enterprising individuals. Political parties and candidates 
acutely evaluate these changes and community conditions 
and behave as rationale prospectors.322
In sum, “[a]s Americans have become more segregated by class, 
distinctive ecologies of political advantage and disadvantage have 
emerged in higher and lower income communities.”323
Interestingly, residential racial segregation, at least in the ab-
sence of concentrated poverty, may not have such deleterious civic 
                                                   
 318. See Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, How the Other Fifth Lives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016), 
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effects. A recent study found that Black neighborhoods foster polit-
ical participation.324 Specifically, it found that “Black Americans liv-
ing in mostly Black spaces tend to turn out at higher rates than 
their counterparts living in more diverse contexts.”325 That said, ra-
cially segregated residential patterns have other negative effects 
and may reinforce political disconnects between communities of 
color and political elites.326
Finally, socioeconomic isolation reinforces the political distance 
between elites and the rest of America. As Thomas Edsall recently 
remarked, a consequence of geographic sorting is that “[t]he well-
to-do are isolated from the day to day struggles of the middle class 
and below”—from health care and education to unemployment 
and financial anxiety about retirement.327
For all these reasons, identifying policies capable of offsetting 
socioeconomic segregation is critical to revitalizing civil society. A 
variety of policies might make inroads at reversing this social isola-
tion. The most direct approach would be for local governments to 
adopt successful inclusionary zoning policies, including ones fo-
cused on deconcentrating poverty, such as the one that has been in 
place in Montgomery County, Maryland since the 1970s.328 Mont-
gomery County requires development projects that will result in at 
least thirty-five residential units to set aside between 12 and 15 per-
cent of those units for sale at below-market rates, and gives the 
government the option to purchase up to one-third of those 
units.329
Local governments should also reconceive how children are dis-
tricted into publicly financed schools.330 Enrollment policies should 
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NINE DISTRICTS, CENTURY FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://tcf.org/content/report/school-
integration-practice-lessons-nine-districts/; see also RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, NEW HOPE FOR 
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affirmatively decouple residency (in segregated neighborhoods) 
from educational opportunity. Local governments could directly 
district elementary schools with an eye to socioeconomic integra-
tion. Alternatively, they could negotiate inter-districting plans.331
Charter schools, similarly, could be required to adopt strategies to 
ensure socioeconomic integration—such as drawing from multiple 
districts within a metropolitan area or instituting a lottery weighted 
for family income.332
The policy feedbacks from integrated schools are likely to be 
multifold. Existing data already shows that individuals who attend-
ed integrated schools are more likely to develop relationships with 
individuals from different backgrounds and to seek out integrated 
neighborhoods and workplaces later in life.333 Public schools, as vis-
ible benefits, are also well known as sites for civic engagement and 
loci for organization. The key, therefore, is to promote school pol-
icies that produce democratic coalitions, rather than parochialism. 
Another untapped site for policy intervention is the American 
workplace—one of the most diverse spaces of American life.334
Workplaces have the added advantage of being places rich in per-
sonal ties and common economic interests.335 Here, the task would 
be to channel existing workplace diversity and social ties into or-
ganizations capable of building civic and political capital that 
bridges critical gulfs in our society. One initial step that states and 
localities could take would be to require employers to facilitate 
payroll deduction to membership-based organizations that demon-
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 334. Kate Tornone, Jenny Yang’s Final Days at the EEOC and Her Hopes for Its Future,
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128 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:1 
strated sufficient levels of interest among their employees.336 New 
York City’s 2017 Deductions Law, which requires fast food chains 
to create and maintain a payroll deduction system to facilitate em-
ployee contributions to selected non-profits, could provide a mod-
el.337 The ideal law, however, would not single out a particular sec-
tor but would apply to all employers of sufficient size. More 
importantly, it would be tailored to facilitate the paying of dues to 
membership-based organizations. Organizations, in other words, 
should not only have to demonstrate sufficient levels of employee 
interest,338 but also demonstrate critical features of active member-
ship—such as opportunities for face-to-face interaction, internal 
democratic governance structures, and national scope.339
D. Enlisting Philanthropists and  
Stimulating Participatory Mass-Membership Groups 
Thus far, the strategies discussed identify the sort of legislative 
policymaking that could offset the participatory weaknesses of con-
temporary civic life but do not get to the heart of the matter: the 
form of contemporary civic associations. Beyond scale, with respect 
to both people and places, the critical weakness of civil society to-
day lies in the demise of self-funded democratically governed 
groups. Indeed, the remaining power of unions is unquestionably 
tied to their economic strength arising out of membership dues—a 
point fully recognized by those targeting the legal structures that 
facilitate this economic wealth.340 By the same token, commentators 
have observed how the absence of self-funding mechanisms (along 
with the choice not to promote internal democracy) limits the po-
litical potential of non-traditional labor movements such as the Na-
tional Domestic Workers Alliance and the “Fight for 15.”341 These 
critics argue that dependence on external funding from unions 
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the last decade have focused on limiting the labor movement’s sources of funding”). 
 341. Lee, supra note 25, at 512. 
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and foundations creates financial instability and undermines in-
centives to expand the membership.342
The final, and most critical, task for a broader democracy re-
form agenda, therefore, is to find ways to stimulate the growth of 
muscular civic associations—organizations capable of operating at 
sufficient scale, while also promoting social ties, active member-
ship, and civic skills.343
This fourth benchmark rests at the limits of law. The fact is that 
it is much easier to see how legislation can stimulate political en-
gagement and the formation of groups than envision how legisla-
tion can restructure the form of the civic groups that emerge. To 
be sure, one could follow the labor law model which requires un-
ions to adopt democratic structures.344 Any effort to impose demo-
cratic governance structures on civic associations, however, is likely 
to raise considerable First Amendment concerns.345
The limits of law to shape the form of civic organizations are less 
discouraging when we appreciate that the burden of restoring 
American democracy can be shared. We are at a unique moment 
politically and technologically. With a good nudge from philan-
thropists, various strands of democratic renewal could well con-
verge to make significant strides toward rebuilding, over the long 
haul, participatory civic associations capable of vindicating the in-
terests of everyday Americans through their mass participation. 
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence in political activism. 
The 2008 election was a high point for voter turnout. It was fol-
lowed shortly thereafter with a series of protest movements draw-
                                                   
 342. Cf. Josh Eidelson, Alt-Labor, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013), https://prospect.org/
article/alt-labor (questioning the long-term political potential of the Restaurant Opportuni-
ties Center, a New York City alt-labor group that has seen significant victories in recent years, 
given that it has a membership base of only 10,000 of the 200,000 workers in the city). 
 343. GILMAN & RAHMAN, supra note 161, at 3 (emphasizing the challenges to scaling up). 
 344. See 29 U.S.C. § 411 (2018) (requiring labor organizations to provide members equal 
rights and privileges and to adopt internal democratic governance structures). 
 345. The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment shields certain civic associa-
tions (expressive associations and political parties) from state intervention in their internal 
governance structures. E.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding 
forced inclusion of a homosexual member pursuant to state’s antidiscrimination law violat-
ed the First Amendment right of the organization to determine membership rules for it-
self); Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (striking down as 
unconstitutional California’s efforts to regulate the internal governance structures of its po-
litical parties). Not all civic groups are currently able to invoke these protections. However, 
several First Amendment scholars have questioned the existing doctrine’s narrow concep-
tion of which organizations should be afforded protection. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, 
Friends, Associates, and Associations, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 54–68, 102 n.213 (2014) [hereinafter 
Abu El-Haj Friends, Associates, and Associations] (arguing that to the degree nonexpressive 
associations further an array of First Amendment goals, the doctrine’s focus on expressive 
associations is misguided); JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF 
ASSEMBLY 1–6, 20–62, 156 (2012) (criticizing current doctrine for being insufficiently pro-
tective of dissenting associations, and defending the need to provide robust protection for 
illiberal associations). 
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ing renewed attention to key concerns of the public, from income 
inequality and money in politics to racism in the criminal justice 
system. Then, there was the unexpected election of Donald 
Trump. Renewed grassroots engagement with democracy moved 
from the political fringes to the mainstream.346 Indeed, by a variety 
of measures, his presidency has marked a significant renewal in civ-
ic engagement, culminating in the highest midterm voter turnout 
in over a century.347
Most promisingly, much of the recent grassroots activism has 
been channeled into participatory political acts and associations. 
Opposition to the election and presidency of Donald Trump has 
brought Americans together in their neighborhoods to take both 
local and national action. Political participation has moved from 
being largely a matter of signing an online petition or making an 
online donation, to protesting at the Women’s March or against 
family separation, sitting in at the offices of one’s Senator, or creat-
ing a local chapter of Indivisible.348
These forays into partisan politics have bred still broader politi-
cal engagement (as the social science literature would predict).349
Individuals (many of them women) have been motivated to run for 
office.350 Teachers across the country have been inspired to strike, 
including in right-to-work states.351 Elsewhere, anti-Trump activism 
has been rechanneled into local concerns and projects.352
There has also been renewed interest in face-to-face forms of 
participatory civic engagement. The irony is that this has been 
made possible, in significant part, by advances in the digital age. 
                                                   
 346. See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 200. 
 347. Rojanasakul et al., supra note 196. 
 348. Indivisible is a network of citizens groups launched to resist the policies of Presi-
dent Trump. It was facilitated by the publication of an online guide to effective political re-
sistance at the grassroots level based on an analysis of what had driven the success of the Tea 
Party. See generally Osita Nwanevu, Indivisible, an Early Anti-Trump Group, Plans for a Democratic 
Future, NEW YORKER (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/indivisible-an-early-anti-trump-group-plans-for-a-democratic-future (noting the authors 
were congressional aides during early years of the Obama administration).
349. Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations, supra note 345, at 81–82, 85–86 
(summarizing empirical research showing how “[i]nitial forays into public life quickly turn 
into a habit, as individuals become part of social networks likely to encourage it” and thus 
how “civic participation breeds more participation”). 
 350. See, e.g., Alexis Sottile, Meet the Women Inspired to Run for Office After the 2016 Election,
ROLLING STONE (Sept. 5, 2017, 7:34 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-
features/meet-the-women-inspired-to-run-for-office-after-the-2016-election-112336/. 
 351. See, e.g., Sean Rossman, Teachers Are Striking All Over. What Is Going On?, U.S.A.
TODAY (Mar. 30, 2018). 
 352. See, e.g., Peter Slevin, Anti-Trump Protests Gave Way to Local Fervor that Helped Turn 
Wisconsin Back to Blue, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/anti-trump-protests-gave-way-to-local-fervor-that-helped-turn-wisconsin-back-to-
blue/2018/11/23/cca2b672-edb7-11e8-baac-2a674e91502b_story.html (describing recent 
civic revival in Eau Claire, Wisconsin and range of local initiatives that individuals energized 
by the 2016 election have undertaken in small groups). 
FALL 2019] Making and Unmaking Citizens 131
The potential for the internet to reduce the transaction costs asso-
ciated with political organizing was quickly understood.353 With its 
maturation, however, activists have grasped that the political po-
tential of social media is greatest when it capitalizes on rich rela-
tionships and then scales up by bridging between closer-tie 
groups.354 This has led to a rekindling of face-to-face politics 
through social media. 
Indeed, more than 5,000 Indivisible chapters have been estab-
lished since 2016, when an online guide was published by experi-
enced Democratic congressional staffers.355 Even more unanticipat-
ed has been their participatory structures. Organized on social 
media, most operate through local chapters that have meetings in 
which attendees negotiate priorities and divide responsibilities.356
Still, such scaling up has not yet occurred for most organiza-
tions. Moreover, small donations rather than membership dues 
tied to participatory rights are, at the moment, the predominate 
alternative to large donor funding. Even those nonpartisan organi-
zations that foster active forms of civic engagement have yet to es-
chew foundation funding. 
Ironically, foundations could step in at the limits of law to cor-
rect these tendencies and to nurture the recent sparks of civic re-
vival by using their control over money to foster a civic reorganiza-
tion capable of significantly impacting electoral politics and 
policymaking in legislatures and administrative agencies. Philan-
thropy has had unintended negative effects on civil society, but it 
has also been a critical driver of egalitarian social movements since 
the mid-twentieth century. In this regard, the main problem with 
modern philanthropy has been that, like most progressives, it has 
overemphasized ideas and expertise and underemphasized the so-
cial foundations of politics. This, however, is changing. Founda-
tions are learning. 
                                                   
 353. See Ben McGuire, Political Organizing in the Digital Age: Why Campaigns Need to Inte-
grate Traditional and Digital Organizing, KENNEDY SCH. REV. (Aug. 22, 2018), 
http://ksr.hkspublications.org/2018/08/22/political-organizing-in-the-digital-age-why-
campaigns-need-to-integrate-traditional-and-digital-organizing/.  
 354. Dana R. Fisher & Marije Boekkooi, Mobilizing Friends and Strangers: Understanding the 
Role of the Internet in the Step It Up Day of Action, 13 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 193, 195 (2010) (re-
viewing research on ways internet has been used to “blend new and old forms of association” 
and how “rather than replacing personal contact, the Internet has been seen to supplement 
it”).
 355. Nwanevu, supra note 348. 
 356. See, e.g., Brenda Schory, Residents Organize with ‘Indivisible Guide’ to Counter Trump 
Policies, KANE COUNTY CHRON. (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.kcchronicle.com/2017/02/05/
residents-organize-with-indivisible-guide-to-counter-trump-policies/ajlyn8a/ (describing a 
coffee-shop meeting of an Illinois chapter of Indivisible); see also About, INDIVISIBLE,
https://indivisible.org/about (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (describing various forms of partici-
pation Indivisible prioritizes, such as “mak[ing] calls,” “show[ing] up,” “speak[ing] with . . . 
neighbors,” and supporting “civic education and leadership development”). 
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Indeed, several prominent foundations have been actively inves-
tigating new approaches to civic empowerment.357 Some have al-
ready pivoted to funding promising groups (rather than individual 
projects). Others have been actively soliciting studies about how 
best to spark more grassroots social change. There has been in-
creased funding for coalition-building as well as longer grant cycles 
to enhance effectiveness and autonomy, and many are working to 
cultivate leaders and decisionmakers among the constituents most 
affected by inequitable policies. All these shifts have been a prod-
uct of increased self-awareness on the part of foundations of the 
power that they wield in shaping civil society.358
Foundations could go further and restructure grants in ways that 
attend to the internal governance structures of civic groups. Grants 
could be structured to nudge the promotion of genuine social ties 
with and among members and the development of socioeconomi-
cally and geographically integrated memberships. Grants could al-
so be structured to build up the capacity of such organizations to 
operate at a national scale through participatory governance struc-
tures.
Indeed, the Ford Foundation recently solicited a review of its 
programming with respect to its initiative, Promoting Electoral Re-
form and Democratic Participation.359 Among the challenges iden-
tified in the review was “the decline of democratic institutions that 
have the local infrastructure” necessary to grow a membership.360
The report recommended that the foundation prioritize the long-
term value of investing to create “strong [federated] organizations 
that can continuously hold institutions [politically] accountable,” 
while themselves being organized to be accountable to their con-
stituencies.361 In this regard, the report specifically recommended 
revising internal metrics to assess not only the capacity of potential 
grantees to achieve tangible, near-term wins (profits) but also their 
capacity to build governance structures and membership levels (as-
sets). Such assets, it argued, are vital insofar as they are critical to 
                                                   
 357. For an illustration of these new approaches in the context of health policy, see 
MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., USC PROGRAM FOR ENVTL. & REG’L EQUITY, THERE’S SOMETHING 
HAPPENING HERE . . . A LOOK AT THE CALIFORNIA ENDOWMENT’S BUILDING HEALTHY 
COMMUNITIES INITIATIVE 21, 25, 30–31 (2014), https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/
docs/TCE-BHC-Narrative-PERE.pdf. 
 358. This new awareness is on display in the USC Program for Environmental and Re-
gional Equity Report on the California Endowment Initiative. See id. at 36–41. 
 359. HAHRIE HAN & LISA ARGYLE, A PROGRAM REVIEW OF THE PROMOTING ELECTORAL 
REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION (PERDP) INITIATIVE OF THE FORD FOUND. 3–4 
(2016), https://www.fordfoundation.org/media/2963/public-hanreport-apr2016.pdf (ana-
lyzing “strategies for increasing civic participation” with a focus on identifying strategies for 
ensuring that democratic participation is “powerful, possible, and probable”). 
 360. Id. at 21. 
 361. Id. at 31.
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the Foundation’s longer-term goals of increasing democratic par-
ticipation and engagement.362
The key, therefore, is to identify useful benchmarks for founda-
tions wishing to assess and develop the capacity of civic associations 
to build governance structures and membership levels capable of 
fostering democratic participation and engagement at a politically 
powerful scale. The previous sections offer useful yardsticks. With 
respect to membership, measures might include: 
the size of membership (perhaps a goal of a minimum 
of 100,000 members);363
diversity of membership, with particular attention to 
socioeconomic diversity; 
active membership (membership involving participa-
tion beyond writing checks); 
ratio of professionals to volunteers; 
regular opportunities for members to form relation-
ships—blending of online and face-to-face opportuni-
ties, including periodic meetings, conferences, and 
conventions.364
With respect to participatory governance structures and the ability 
to operate at political scale, measures might include: 
democratic internal governance structures; 
financial reliance on membership dues to provide 
both engagement and a level of independence from 
foundations and private donors;365
a federated structure of subchapters in different states 
or localities (on the order of 2,000 state or local chap-
ters) or similar evidence of geographic spread.366
The purpose of these measures would be to nurture emerging 
civic groups and nudge existing organizations toward greater ap-
preciation of the democratic value of active membership, social ties 
                                                   
 362. Id. at 8, 22, 23, 27, 29–30 (defining assets as including “strengthen[ing] the rela-
tionship between the organization and its constituency and [] translat[ing] those relation-
ships into elite lobbying power,” “having a robust infrastructure at the state and local level,” 
and advocating for policies that will have positive political “feedback loops”). 
 363. These figures are based on the membership levels and organizational infrastructure 
of the large voluntary associations that dominated the mid-twentieth century. See SKOCPOL,
supra note 114, at 90–91. 
 364. There is good evidence that successful membership-based civic associations deepen 
the commitment of participants by creating a sense of community in the course of leader-
ship development; however, those efforts do not require that the contact be in-person. 
Blended strategies work. See HAHRIE HAN, HOW ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOP ACTIVISTS: CIVIC 
ASSOCIATIONS & LEADERSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17–23 (2014). 
 365. See id. at 5 n.8 (identifying a key structure of membership-based organizations as 
dependence on volunteers and governance through elected bodies). 
 366. SKOCPOL, supra note 114, at 90–91. 
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between members, and participatory democratic structures. With 
respect to the goal of nudging established civic groups toward dif-
ferent internal structures, it is worth noting that some civic associa-
tions, even before the recent political revival, had begun to take 
notice of the cost of operating without actual members. When the 
ACLU of Pennsylvania and the Public Interest Law Center of Phil-
adelphia (PILCOP) sought to challenge Pennsylvania’s voter iden-
tification law in 2012, they scrambled to identify individuals who 
lacked the requisite documentation proving their eligibility to vote. 
The NAACP presumably did not have to scramble in 1950s and 
1960s to find plaintiffs. Similarly, when the Pension Rights Center 
sought to persuade the Department of Labor to adopt a rule that 
would make it easier for workers without access to employer-
managed 401(k)s to save for retirement, it could not rely on its 
membership. It, ultimately, located seniors to testify to their re-
tirement savings struggles through an affiliate that provides direct 
services to seniors. In both cases, the professionalized associations 
settled on a strategy of partnering with member-oriented groups. 
Such groups, however, are not available for large swaths of Ameri-
cans—including consumers, millennials, and working parents. 
Finally, it is worth noting that it might be in foundations’ inter-
est to take up this particular democratic reform agenda. Founda-
tions are often looking for ways to wean the organizations that they 
fund without undermining the investments they have already 
made. In this regard, encouraging the development of dues-paying 
membership at scale (for example, as a condition of access to fu-
ture funding) would provide a strategy for partially weaning groups 
off the foundation as the primary source of funding. 
While foundations offer the most promising avenue for re-
empowering civil society, the limits of law as a lever for rekindling 
membership-based civic associations organized through democrat-
ic governance structures should not be overstated. In addition to 
the payroll legislation discussed in the previous section, the federal 
tax code in principle could be used to reshape the form of civic as-
sociations by modifying the bases for offering such groups non-
profit status.367 That said, especially in the wake of the 2017 
                                                   
 367. The Internal Revenue Code shapes civil society through two provisions—Chapter 
501 and Chapter 170—and the intersection between them. Under Chapter 501, the tax-
exempt status of an organization is defined by its ends. See 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2018). It has 
long been assumed that these provisions significantly contribute to the size and renown of 
the nonprofit sector in the United States. See David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduc-
tion, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 533 (2006) (noting that “its generosity is widely seen as an engine 
of America’s [robust] nonprofit sector”). Some scholars, however, do question how much 
the charitable deduction induces more charitable giving, and the empirical claim is difficult 
to prove insofar as it depends on determining a counterfactual (i.e., how much giving would 
occur in the absence of the tax incentive?). Still, the above makes clear that the claim that 
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amendments to the tax code, there are at least three strikes against 
it as a route to reform. First, under the amended tax code, fewer 
and fewer Americans are likely to itemize deductions for charitable 
donations.368 Second, the line between 501(c)(3)s and 501(c)(4)s is 
salient for corporate lawyers and on Tax Day, but phenomenologi-
cally, it is fictitious. The NRA, Boy Scouts, NOW—indeed any na-
tionally significant civic association that is likely to come to mind—
operate as both 501(c)(3)s and (4)s. For members and the public, 
they are experienced as a single association—just as McDonalds is 
experienced as a single corporation. Finally, any changes to the 
current structure of the Internal Revenue Code will face significant 
resistance from its current beneficiaries. Thus, while tax reform of-
fers a possible legal route to stimulate democratically governed, 
membership-based groups, its potential to nudge civil society in 
this direction seems much less promising than changing the condi-
tions in foundation grantmaking.369
                                                   
implementing social policy through the tax code renders government spending invisible in 
ways that undermine the vibrancy of civic associations and political participation does not 
tell the whole story. 
 368. The tax code’s most-preferred tax status arises from tax breaks on both ends—i.e., 
where both donations to the entity and the entity’s income are tax exempt. It is currently 
bestowed on the subset of tax-exempt organizations known as “public charities.” 26 U.S.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) (2018) (providing that to constitute a public charity, under 501(c)(3), the 
“[c]orporation[], . . . community chest, fund, or foundation” must be operated “exclusively 
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster 
national or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or 
animals” on a not-for-profit basis) (emphasis added). Public charities, in return, must forgo, 
to a substantial degree, activities aimed at influencing legislation or elections. For example, 
a 501(c)(3) is limited with respect to the money it can spend engaging in either “grassroots 
expenditures” or “lobbying . . . for the purpose of influencing legislation,” and it is entirely 
prohibited from “participat[ing] in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition 
to) any candidate for public office.” Id. § 501(c)(3), (h). In addition, “no part of the net 
earnings” of such associations may “inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or in-
dividual.” Id. § 501(c)(3). The recent tax reforms significantly limit the incentive for the av-
erage taxpayer to itemize deductions (including charitable deductions), thereby rendering 
this aspect of the tax code a less significant lever. The benefit of the tax code’s allowance 
that individuals and corporations may deduct contributions to such organizations from their 
taxable income is that it permits high-income taxpayers to lower their marginal tax rate. 
 369. In principle, the Internal Revenue Code could be amended to provide additional 
tax relief to organizations that create meaningful civic opportunities for individual mem-
bers. For the reasons explained above, the attributes to reward would include: dues-paying 
membership, socioeconomic and geographic diversity of membership, opportunities for 
face-to-face engagement, and participatory internal governance structures. In other words, a 
revised Code would be recalibrated so that tax-exempt status turned on both the purposes 
and the organizational structure of an association. To be clear, many civic associations that 
already exhibit these attributes, e.g., unions, are eligible for tax-exempt status under the 
current Code. See id. § 501(c)( 4)–(12), (19), (23) (providing tax-exemption status to labor, 
agricultural and horticultural organizations, business leagues and chambers of commerce, 
recreational clubs, various types of fraternal benefit societies and orders, as well as veteran’s 
associations). The problem is that they are not given preferential treatment, as compared to 
those organizations that are professionally run and foundation funded. Moreover, their tax-
exempt status does not turn on their organizational structure per se, but rather on the pur-
pose for which they are formed. 
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* * *
In sum, it is time to broaden the democracy reform agenda to 
include the pursuit of policies that are likely to motivate individu-
als to participate in our democracy, stimulate the reorganization of 
the interests of everyday Americans, and fuel the nascent signs of 
civic revival. Legislation offers a significantly underappreciated lev-
er through which to do this, and it is encouraging that many of the 
proposals that are on the existing policy menu, if approached wise-
ly, could start that process. Reforms that have not yet become po-
larized are particularly promising in this regard.370
Beyond identifying policy priorities, however, any bill that is be-
ing seriously considered should be subject to a rigorous policy-
feedback analysis. The potential for positive collateral consequenc-
es ultimately depends on resisting the temptation to disguise the 
distribution of government largesse. We must learn from Obama’s 
mistakes. During the Obama years, Democrats made significant ef-
forts to reverse the trend toward directing the bulk of government 
social spending toward corporations and households in the very 
highest socioeconomic brackets. Unemployment benefits were ex-
tended during the Great Recession, the number of uninsured 
Americans substantially dropped, and the federal government took 
on a direct role in student lending. Unfortunately, many of these 
programs were distributed as tax incentives or by private actors, 
rendering invisible the myriad benefits the new government had 
conferred on middle-class Americans.371
CONCLUSION
The path from political participation to policy responsiveness is 
not straightforward. Structural features of American democracy 
stand in the way—from the Senate and Electoral College to the 
fact that officials are elected in winner-take-all elections. As such, 
neither eagerly participating in the pluralist chorus nor electing 
one’s preferred candidate guarantees the policy responsiveness 
that many Americans are craving. Still, there is a long way from 
where we are to a place where the gaps in policy attention can rea-
sonably be attributed to these structural barriers to responsiveness. 
                                                   
 370. It may be concerning to some that it appears that only progressive reforms have 
positive returns for political capacity and democratic responsiveness: Where does this leave a 
good government, economic conservative, firmly opposed to government redistribution of 
wealth in either direction, but equally concerned that elected officials are insufficiently re-
sponsive to the preferences of ordinary Americans? 
 371. Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State, supra note 229, passim.
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The future of American democracy depends on broadening our 
conception of what good governance reform entails. We must 
acknowledge that democratic dysfunctions also stem from distor-
tions in the political inputs (civil society). Only once we move be-
yond our myopic focus on procedural reforms will it be possible to 
appreciate the full array of opportunities that exist to rebuild our 
democratic institutions or to identify the allies capable of sharing 
that burden. 
The path forward is sure to face significant obstacles—and not 
simply because the beneficiaries of the New Gilded Age will oppose 
challenges to their political power. The socioeconomic segregation 
of contemporary life poses a formidable challenge to efforts to re-
verse the vicious cycle of democratic politics today. But there are 
other obstacles. 
While there are no silver policy bullets, we can take heart in the 
knowledge that the demise of American democracy was not inevi-
table, and its revival is similarly not foreclosed. Entrenched prob-
lems demand multifaceted interventions aimed at incremental 
change, but they also demand vision. 

